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This thesis views interstate actions between the Russian Federation and its perceived 
adversaries through the lens of the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine.” It traces the difference in 
origins of sovereignty between the United States and Russia in its various forms. After showing 
that Russian sovereignty relies on the stability of the state over individual liberties, this thesis 
dissects Russian nationalism as a foreign policy tool in Ukraine. Finally, this thesis applies the 
Gerasimov Doctrine across a swath of foreign policy interactions between the Russian 
Federation and its adversaries: Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Through the 
Doctrine’s lens, this thesis finds that Russian foreign policy actions are inversely proportionate to 
the adversary state’s ability to create the potential for political upheaval in the Russian 
Federation. This thesis serves as a starting point from which future research can begin to 
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The Gerasimov Doctrine is a transcribed speech from Russian General of the Army 
Valery Gerasimov in 2013, one year before the Russian Federation annexed Crimea and covertly 
invaded eastern Ukraine. It describes political upheavals and the role non-military, covert 
intelligence actions play in said revolutions. In the West, the Gerasimov Doctrine has largely 
been misinterpreted as a “playbook” of Russian information confrontation.1 Viewed this way, the 
Gerasimov Doctrine is a methodology dictating which non-military national levers of power to 
pull to create the same effect of an overt military operation. As the phrase’s creator, Mark 
Galeotti, and separately, Charles Bartles, point out, this is not the case.2 Instead, the Gerasimov 
Doctrine was a proposed way to understand what the Russian Federation believed to be Western 
 
1 Mark Galeotti, “I’m Sorry for Creating the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine,’” Foreign Policy, March 5, 2018, 
accessed May 15, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/. 
2 Charles Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (January-February, 2016): 31-32. 
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intelligence efforts to effect regime change in the Arab Spring and Ukraine’s Euromaidan 
protests. In the same vein, it is a lens through which foreign policy can be understood. 
Interpreting the Gerasimov Doctrine as Bartles does provides a clearer understanding of 
nebulous topics that are typically shrouded in secrecy within intelligence agencies: cyber 
warfare, psychological operations, and denial and deception campaigns. These modern-day 
activities evolved from a Soviet military concept, maskirovka, which covered physical denial and 
deception in military operations.  
To understand this evolution, the paper first looks at the origins and differing perceptions 
of the right to self-determination between Russian governments and the United States. This 
evolves into a discussion on using Russian nationalism as a foreign policy tool that, in turn, 
supports its domestic policy. Finally, interactions between the Russian Federation and the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Ukraine are evaluated according to the Gerasimov Doctrine. Doing 
so provides a distinct approach to foreign policy that differs greatly from Western beliefs. 
In the first chapter, this thesis focuses on the founding ideas of the United States based on 
a perception of the people’s right to self-determination. The U.S. view is then contrasted against 
a Russian perception of a similar idea, one that on the surface seems to be decided by its citizens 
but is instead driven by the state—which is charged with providing security and stability above 
all else. This difference, where one state is founded on the freedom of choice and difference of 
opinion, and the other on unifying its peoples under a central “idea,” is critical to understanding 
the two states’ clashing views on sovereignty.  
Applying the Hegelian dialectic to these differences pits them against each other as 
opposing ideas in search of a central truth. How can the U.S. idea of a group’s right of self-
determination combine with a Russian perspective that places the state’s security and stability 
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above the needs of its people? It is inherently contradictory to combine the two ideas, hence the 
struggle between these two states. No current form of government allows for the freedom of its 
people as a core tenet while simultaneously controlling them to ensure the continuity of the 
government at any cost. 
Using the above as a foundation, the first chapter then examines the behavior of the 
United States and Russia—in its tsarist, communist, and democratic forms—on the world stage. 
Where Russia seeks to aid foreign governments in maintaining power, protecting historical 
cultural norms, and reducing outside interference of those states’ internal politics, the United 
States works to spread democracy as a means to promote peace in a march toward a 
cosmopolitan world. The Russian approach is derived from a multitude of factors: historical rule 
by outsiders, a lack of natural environmental borders, humiliating military defeats, and a view as 
the duly appointed protectors of Christianity. The United States is quite the opposite: it has not 
known true foreign military invasion and occupation, is geographically protected, and has 
promoted its military and economic victories while downplaying its losses such that the phrase 
“American exceptionalism” plays a serious role in the American view of the world. The Russian 
and American perspectives are in constant tension, and their views on sovereignty affect 
sovereign states worldwide. 
The first chapter concludes with an introduction to maskirovka, a recurring element in 
this thesis. Originally used as a military term to encompass physical denial and deception 
techniques on the battlefield, maskirovka today is interpreted as a whole-of-government 
approach to foreign policy using all intelligence tools at its disposal.3 It follows a basic logic: if 
the role of the Russian government is to ensure its own survival, then it is morally justifiable to 
 
3 James Roberts, “Maskirovka 2.0: Hybrid Threat, Hybrid Response” (JSOU Press Occasional Paper, 
December 2015), accessed October 9, 2017, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1007494.pdf. 
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use all levers of state power in pursuit of that goal. This chapter has established that at the core, 
the United States and Russia have wholly different views of sovereignty. These can be framed by 
the Hegelian dialectic within each state and as state-on-state interactions. Through being locked 
in ideological conflict with each other, each state will naturally vie for victory. For the United 
States, this entails using democracy’s conflict of ideas to reach a mutual understanding. For the 
Russian Federation, it is obligated to use maskirovka to disturb those democratic ideas because 
they are a threat to the continuity of the state. 
In the second chapter, this thesis progresses from the origins of how the Russian 
Federation approaches foreign policy in dissecting a significant tool in its foreign policy toolbox: 
nationalism. The most appropriate physical location to witness Russian nationalism as a foreign 
policy tool is in Ukraine—the two states have a shared history that dates back nearly one 
thousand years. Ukraine is also a former Soviet Bloc country that is quite literally divided in half 
culturally and ideologically. Thus, Ukraine is both a potential existential threat to the “Russian 
Idea” and a prime location for the Russian Federation to protect itself. 
Ukraine is ideologically divided into Western and Eastern halves based on religion, 
language, views of the EU and Russia, and other cultural factors. The Western half is more 
aligned with what is colloquially referred to as “the West,” while Eastern Ukraine is more 
ethnically Russian and more aligned with Russian views. Such an internal conflict is a prime 
location for the Russian Federation to conduct its information warfare (known in Russian as 
information confrontation), the modern-day maskirovka. Likewise, the shared history between 
Ukrainians and Russians implies that Ukraine is a potential conduit for Western ideologies to 
infiltrate the “Russian Idea.” This modern perception of the “Russian Idea” is one of shared 
cultural history amongst all its varied peoples, personified in Russian President Vladimir Putin. It 
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is a central component to unifying these diverse groups under a sole, federated government. It 
follows that any challenge to this Russian Idea is also a threat to the state. 
 Russian nationalism is used in Ukraine as a buffer against the existential threat from the 
West. It shores up support among ethnic Russians in Ukraine while challenging Ukrainian 
narratives.4 Promoting nationalist behavior among Russians is not only effective, it is dangerous. 
Putin has used nationalism and the “Russian Idea” to validate military actions abroad, including 
the Georgian wars, suppressing Chechen rebellions, and the annexation of Crimea from Ukraine. 
The pull of nationalism beyond patriotism is strong, and Putin risks losing his grip on those 
under its spell. 
Chapter Two also finds an unexpected threat in nationalism that may challenge the 
Russian Idea. Putin used nationalism as a foreign policy tool to justify ethnic Russians’ right to 
self-determination outside the Russian Federations borders.5 However, as discussed previously in 
Chapter Two, Russian self-determination is more the state’s choice than it is a people’s choice. 
This creates a problem for Putin’s government: Russian nationalist pride may separate the 
modern Russian Idea from Putin and use his own words against him. These groups can use 
Putin’s justification to claim they have that selfsame right to self-determination, and that they 
believe they will be better off without Putin’s government. Historically speaking, when the 
Russian Idea separates itself from the identity of the ruler, revolution follows. This chapter 
concludes with implications of nationalism’s use in Russian foreign policy and its potential 
domestic risks should Putin lose control of his nationalist base. Ukraine, for its part, is beset with 
 
4 Leonid Peisakhin and Arturas Rozenas, “Electoral Effects of Biased Media: Russian Television in 
Ukraine,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 3 (March 30, 2018), accessed March 30, 2018, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12355. 
5 Vladimir Putin, “Russia: The Ethnicity Issue,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 23, 2012, accessed October 
18, 2017, http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/17831/. 
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a difficult decision—as a state split in two and encroached upon by a significantly more powerful 
neighbor, how can it move forward to peace and prosperity? 
In the third chapter, this thesis uses the Gerasimov Doctrine as a lens to view foreign 
policy actions. This differs significantly from the Western interpretation of the Doctrine, which 
views it as a playbook of sorts for Russian information confrontation. The Gerasimov Doctrine is 
not a playbook, but a perspective on the way states interact. This chapter evaluates actions and 
reactions between Russia and (separately) the United States, United Kingdom, and Ukraine, 
through the Gerasimov Doctrine. While the Doctrine is not an official Russian government 
document, it is a helpful tool to reduce misunderstandings and misinterpretations between Russia 
and the colloquial “West.” 
 The third chapter begins with an overview of the Gerasimov Doctrine, which combines 
military and non-military actions on a joined scale of conflict. Blending the two on a shared scale 
is an important difference from the West, where non-military actions such as sanctions and 
diplomacy can be viewed as de-escalatory forks away from the road to conflict. Making this 
distinction reduces the potential for mirror imaging by either side—while the West and the 
Russian Federation may have the same destination (successful execution of their foreign policy), 
their approaches are quite different.  
With this understanding, the third chapter then evaluates events between Russia and the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Ukraine, with each divided into social, information, and 
military spheres of activity. These spheres of state power are chosen because they reflect the 
growing interconnectedness of state behavior. Each of these events are cursory case studies that 
merit further research. This thesis opens the door to viewing multiple interstate relations and 
spheres of political influence through the Gerasimov Doctrine. 
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After evaluating each event through the Gerasimov Doctrine, this chapter finds that 
Russian actions toward an adversarial state inversely scale in aggressiveness according to that 
state’s ability to affect the Russian status quo. For instance, the Russian Federation is 
significantly more active with its military toward Ukraine than Russia is toward the United 
Kingdom. Likewise, the Russian Federation conducted multiple assassinations within the United 
Kingdom, but Russian covert activities within the United States are far less aggressive. While 
these findings may seem obvious to an observer versed in governmental behavior, it is through 
comparing and weighing these events via the Gerasimov Doctrine that this chapter, and 
ultimately this thesis, contributes to scholarly discourse. 
Many academics have, and continue to, call for additional research into measuring the 
effects of information confrontation. The fourth chapter of this thesis provides a brief summary 
of how Russian foreign policy advanced into the twenty-first century. A key component of their 
advances has been the exponential growth of worldwide access to telecommunication 
technology. The internet, and especially social media, are optimal tools for Russian information 
confrontation. Their modern-day maskirovka campaigns are used to sow discord among Western 
states as a means of competition on Gerasimov’s scale of conflict. How can something so 
abstract be measured? This chapter provides a basic framework founded on existing scholarship 
and current, unclassified military doctrine.  
Finally, policymakers and intelligence agencies alike may glean a variety of lessons from 
the approach and insights of this thesis.  First and foremost, viewing both their own and the 
Russian Federation’s actions through the Gerasimov Doctrine instead of from their native 
country’s perspective may significantly reduce potential for mirror imaging and miscalculating 
Russian intent or their respective reactions. Second, the Gerasimov Doctrine is not an official 
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Russian Federation doctrine, but it is a rare insight on Russian governmental thinking and 
provides a new perspective for understanding that behavior. Third, the Gerasimov Doctrine is not 
a “playbook” on Russian information confrontation, it is a viewpoint that incorporates modern 
state-level non-military levers of power into a widely-accepted scale of conflict. It is, in essence, 
a modification of von Clausewitz’s perspective on war: instead of war being policy by other 









A Dialectic of Self-Determination 
 
1.1  Abstract 
 
 State behavior between Russia and the United States in contemporary time is a widely 
covered topic. However, research into Russian policies toward perceived adversaries—of which 
the United States is one—is lacking. There are two interrelated Russian concepts that stand out: a 
military practice of denial, deception, misinformation, and disinformation termed Maskirovka, 
and the Gerasimov Doctrine, an adaptation of maskirovka into non-military applications. 
Because there is an absence of scholarly work in this area, this paper looks at the origins of the 
concepts, and compared them to their American counterparts. More specifically, this paper has 
found that both the United States and Russia’s perspectives of foreign policy derived from 






1.2  Introduction 
 
 By evaluating the evolution of foreign policy from the core concepts of sovereignty, this 
paper identifies essential elements that continue to bring the Russian Federation and the United 
States into conflict. A comprehensive understanding of the origins of these relations will direct 
future research by providing a solid foundation of knowledge. To do this, this paper divides 
perspectives into two schools of thought—divided by country—the United States and the 
Russian Federation. Following a summary of current research, this paper assesses the 
implications of maskirovka and the Gerasimov Doctrine in Russian actions against the United 
States. This literature review is a study of origins of the two states’ foreign policy strategies, and 
not a direct study of the applications themselves. By illuminating the significance of these 
concepts and their implications, academics and policymakers alike can better research and 
analyze future Russian attempts to disrupt American society. 
Understanding what defines the sovereignty enables us to view international relations 
from the perspective of a particular state. The modern-day interactions between the United States 
and the Russian Federation originated centuries prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both 
states created different interpretations of what it meant to be a sovereign entity, and how its 
citizens should interact with their respective governments. This difference—minor in its initial 
formation—expanded and evolved into the global competition for influence seen today. From 
these origins, the United States and Russia have applied their versions of sovereignty onto other 
sovereign states as a method of influence and control. 
The United States’ interpretation of sovereignty is wholly different than the Russian 




self-determination: that the people are the source of all power and legitimacy of their state. For 
the United States, these powers are created by the people, for the people, and designed to protect 
their “unalienable rights… [of] Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”6 Where the United 
States government finds sovereignty to be a function of the voice of the people, the Russian 
Federation views sovereignty as a creation of the state to ensure the continuity of the state, at the 
expense of individual freedoms for its people. The stability and security of the Russian state is 
intrinsically linked to its people through the concept of the “Russian Idea,” covered at length in 
Chapter Two. 
1.3  Origins of Self-Determination  
 
 The most important theorist to the source of international relations is GWF Hegel with 
his concept of self-determination. The United States and Russia’s have different interpretations 
of the Hegelian dialectic. “A nation does not begin by being a state.” Hegel wrote, “the transition 
from a family, a horde, a clan, a multitude, &c., to political conditions is the realization of the 
Idea in the form of that nation.”7 During these transitions, the society modifies its cultural norms 
and adapts to new environments while advancing towards the creation of a nation. If the physical 
area controlled by the nation expands, the nation adjusts its policies and beliefs to either 
incorporate, accommodate, acknowledge, or reject newly assimilated nations.  
 Foreign policy, at a macro level, can be misdirected by mirror imaging to the point of 
policy failure. Mirror imaging is defined by the Central Intelligence Agency as “assuming that 
the other side is likely to act in a certain way because that is how the US would act under similar 
 
6 U.S. Congress, Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776. 
7 GWF Hegel, “The Philosophy of Right,” in The Nationalism Reader, ed. Omar Dahbour and Micheline 




circumstances.”8 For instance, the United States believes other countries would benefit from 
adopting American liberal democracy.9 If it worked for the United States, it will work for 
everyone else—or so the logic goes. Conversely, Russia promotes sovereign stability and state 
security abroad, advocating for less international involvement in internal affairs. From a Russian 
perspective, because internal stability and security allowed Russia to focus on its international 
agenda, sponsoring it in other states must be the correct approach.  
Differing political theories—especially regarding the concept of self-determination—
drive the relationships of these two great states. Indeed, this is not a new concept. Tocqueville 
witnessed the different approaches to the success of the United States and then-Tsarist Russia in 
the early 19th century: 
All other peoples seem to have nearly reached their natural limits and to need nothing but 
to preserve them; but these two are growing. All the others have halted or advanced only 
through great exertions; they alone march easily and quickly forward along a path whose 
end no eye can yet see. The American fights against natural obstacles; the Russian is at 
grips with men.10 
 If this is not new, why does this matter, and how can analysis of this problem assist each 
state in understanding and cooperating—or combatting—the other? Fukuyama describes the 
Hegelian dialectic as a formula for societal progress: “History proceeds through a continual 
process of conflict, wherein systems of thought as well as political systems collide and fall apart 
from their own internal contradictions. They are then replaced by less contradictory and therefore 
higher ones, which give rise to new and different contradictions--the so-called dialectic.”11 In 
 
8 Richards Heuer, “Psychology of Intelligence Analysis,” Central Intelligence Agency, March 16, 
2007, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-
monographs/psychology-of-intelligence-analysis/art9.html (accessed December 1, 2017). 
9 Stephen Walt, “Why Is America So Bad at Promoting Democracy in Other 
Countries?,” Voice (blog), Foreign Policy, April 25, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/25/why-is-america-so-
bad-at-promoting-democracy-in-other-countries/ (accessed November 6, 2017). 
10 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc, 2000), 413. 




applying it to Russia and the United States, it is possible to identify any correlations among self-
determination and foreign policy. Likewise, evaluating the two countries’ origins and tying them 
to today’s motives will identify potential areas for future research. This paper identifies a 
progression of thought—in both the United States and Russia—that begins with their respective 
perceptions of self-determination, and culminates with their behavior in contemporary 
international society. These two conflicting paths provide greater understanding of each state’s 
conduct, and explains the “why” behind their actions today. 
1.4  The United States 
 
 A core tenant of the American form of self-determination resides in liberty. Wood divides 
liberty into two groups: “Public or political liberty - or what we now call positive liberty - meant 
participation in government. And this political liberty in turn provided the means by which the 
personal liberty and private rights of the individual - what we today called negative liberty - were 
protected.” 12 Liberty, then, allows a citizen to influence the direction of the state through their 
participation. Therefore, because a citizen’s voice is heard at a federal level, they are involved in 
the process of determining the state’s identity.  
Tocqueville identifies sovereignty as a manifestation of this liberty, writing that “…in 
America the sovereignty of the people is neither hidden nor sterile as with some other nations; 
mores recognize it, and the laws proclaim it; it spreads with freedom and attains unimpeded its 
ultimate consequences.”13 Aligned with this argument for including citizens in the affairs of 
government is conflict within a democracy. Democratic conflict is a conflict of ideas and 
opinions that spurred opposing sides to compromise which limited the threat of oppression 
 
12 Gordon Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1992), 104. 




through majority rule. In Federalist No. 10, Madison found this conflict best contained within a 
Republican Congress to act as representatives for the citizens.14 
Ideological conflict has the potential to divide a nation if left unchecked, as the American 
Civil War has shown. By following this logical chain from civic citizenship reflected in the 
government’s behavior, the American Civil War can thus be viewed as an ideological conflict 
between competing schools of thought of each belligerent’s respective citizenry channeled 
through their elected officials. However, managed conflict is necessary for a healthy democracy. 
In Federalist 51, management is suggested in the form of a “compound Republic,” described as a 
system of checks and balances between competing governmental branches which lowers the risk 
of a despotic state.15 For the United States, liberty, checks and balances, and representative 
government also required equality of all under the supreme authority of the Constitution. 
“Equality of opportunity,” Wood wrote, “would help to encourage a rough equality of 
condition. Such a rough equality of condition was in fact essential for republicanism.”16 Equality 
adds reassurance to citizens that their voice is equal to all others, and provides legitimacy to the 
democratic republican system. According to Supreme Court Justice Breyer, a citizen’s belief in 
the legitimacy of their government is a larger factor than the laws themselves in determining if 
the citizen will abide by laws the government sets forth.17  
Each of these elements of American society created a belief that individual citizens have 
the right to interact with their government so they can see their needs addressed. In addition, the 
 
14 James Madison, Federalist No. 10: "The Same Subject Continued: The Union as a Safeguard Against 
Domestic Faction and Insurrection," New York Daily Advertiser, November 22, 1787, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers. 
15 Alexander Hamilton or James Madison, Federalist No. 51: “The Structure of the Government Must 
Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments,” New York Packet, February 8, 1788, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers  
16 Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 234. 




founding fathers ensured these rights would not be infringed by establishing checks and balances 
between governmental powers. Equality promoted a progressive, liberal sentiment among the 
public because no one had the right to be legally superior to another. As these beliefs solidified 
within the American public, they began to be expressed outwardly to other states through foreign 
policy. “We must stabilize a new international order in a vastly dangerous environment,” 
Kissinger wrote in American Foreign Policy, “but our ultimate goal must be to transform 
ideological conflict into constructive participation in building a better world.”18 Note Kissinger’s 
use of “ideological conflict,” a call back to the Hegelian dialectic as interpreted by the founding 
fathers. Kissinger then translates this American perspective of governance into foreign policy. 
 Kissinger’s injection of American democratic ideals into foreign policy implies that the 
United States is the superior world power. American exceptionalism reveals itself throughout 
history—perhaps most notably in “Manifest Destiny”—when the United States asserted its right 
to expand and spread its ideals over sovereign nations. John O’Sullivan celebrates Manifest 
Destiny with enthusiasm: “For this blessed mission to the nations of the world, which are shut 
out from the life-giving light of truth, has America been chosen.”19 The United States promoted 
democracy because it believed American democracy to be the best form of governing to ensure 
liberty and equality across the world.  
 Therefore, the United States was—by its very nature—the obvious choice for spreading 
democracy across the globe. During the twentieth century, the United States became one of two 
spheres of influence. Reinhold Niebuhr summed up the necessity of the United States’ strong 
example to the world as such: “Today we have become the senior partners in a vast alliance of 
 
18 Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1977), 305. 
19 John O'Sullivan, “The Great Nation of Futurity,” The United States Democratic Review 6, no. 23 





nations, trying desperately to achieve sufficient unity and health to ward off the threat of 
tyrannical unification of the world.”20 In fact, Niebuhr goes so far as to declare that the United 
States has a responsibility to spread democracy.21 Through his perspective, the United States is 
the shepherd of the international community, and to neglect its flock would be counter to the 
American beliefs of equality and liberty for all. 
 The transition from a relatively isolationist state to promoting democracy throughout the 
world is a heavily researched topic. While outside the scope of this paper, it is worth noting as 
the United States’ sovereignty solidified and its borders expanded, so too did its belief in its duty 
to promote American democracy. Hartz described this interpretation of American exceptionalism 
as “messianic,” an apt term to illustrate the United States’ perceived infallibility.22 In 1998, 
Robert Kagan argued that the United States’ supremacy on the world stage was taken for 
granted, and thus the differences between American and Soviet foreign policy forgotten. Kagan 
showed how American foreign policy brought up less fortunate nations to promote the American 
ideal of—to use Wood’s phrases— “equality of opportunity” which in turn would create a 
“rough equality of condition” across the globe: 
Beyond the style of American hegemony, which, even if unevenly applied, undoubtedly 
did more to attract than repel other peoples and nations, American grand strategy in the 
Cold War consistently entailed providing far more to friends and allies than was expected 
from them in return. Thus, it was American strategy to raise up from the ruins powerful 
economic competitors in Europe and Asia, a strategy so successful that by the 1980s the 
United States was thought to be in a state of irreversible "relative" economic decline —- 
relative, that is, to those very nations whose economies it had restored after World War 
II.23 
 
20 Reinhold Niebuhr, “America’s Precarious Eminence,” in Reinhold Niebuhr On Politics: His Political 
Philosophy and Its Application to Our Age as Expressed in His Writings, ed. Harry R. Davis (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1960), 269. 
21 Niebuhr, 280-82. 
22 Louis Hartz, “The Coming of Age of America,” American Political Science Review 51, no. 2 (June 1957): 
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The long journey from the birth of the United States’ right to self-determination guided 
the state along a path toward promoting inclusiveness, equality and liberty in its foreign policy. 
At the same time, there was significant criticism of the United States “spreading democracy” 
through involvement in sovereign states’ internal affairs, often referred to as imperialist. Many 
theorists, especially Lenin, viewed Western democracy as a tool for capitalist exploitation of the 
less fortunate by the wealthy.24 This assertion runs counter to the American democratic belief 
that bringing opportunity to all—and thus equality and liberty—increases the well-being of 
everyone involved. It also shows a deep misunderstanding of the origins and intent of American 
foreign policy, a misunderstanding returned in kind through American views on Russian foreign 
policy. As discussed previously, these misunderstandings often resulted from mirror imaging and 
failing to “walk a mile in their [someone else’s] shoes.”  
1.5  The Russian Federation 
 
 Russian application of the right to self-determination takes a wholly different path. 
Centuries of oppression and military defeat helped create the cornerstones of Russian society: 
stability and security. Today, the Russian Federation outwardly promotes these beliefs through 
their foreign policy. Russia has also experienced a wider variety of governmental institutions 
than the United States. From the feudal and monarchist periods Tocqueville referenced, to the 
communist revolution, to its collapse seventy years later into what would become—as David 
Satter meticulously describes—a kleptocracy, Russian society held onto the desire for stability 
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and security above all else, even above the value of human life.25 The periods preceding the 
communist revolution are discussed at length in the following chapter on Russian nationalism. 
 The Russian quest for self-determination begins over a century after the West’s 
Enlightenment. In 1905, Russia became the first European state to be defeated by an Asian 
power, Japan. For Russians, the defeat marked the final event in a long line of Tsarist failures. 
Communists called for an end to the Russian monarchy, resulting in the October Revolution of 
1917. “Complete equality of rights for all nations;” Lenin wrote, “the right of nations to self-
determination; the amalgamation of the workers of all nations - this is the national program that 
Marxism, the experience of the whole world, and the experience of Russia, teaches the 
workers.”26 
 Lenin’s call to unify international society started with the Russians, and a successful 
Russian example would then lead the way to an international communist revolution. Russian 
unification under communism was an interpretation of Prince Vladimir’s call for a united Russia 
under Christianity, 900 years prior. Again, a nuanced discussion of this history is covered in the 
nationalism chapter. The belief of a culturally-unified Russia echoes in Stalin’s 1914 essay, 
Marxism and the National-Colonial Question: “A nation is a historically evolved, stable 
community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a 
community of culture.”27 Stalin’s concept of a nation also established an umbrella of stability 
under which all elements of national identity must reside. Maintaining that absolute stability 
required placing security above the needs of citizens. 
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 Military failures in the Tsarist period created doubt to the legitimacy of a Tsar’s power 
and authority. Consequently, the Soviet government needed a security apparatus that enveloped 
all facets of life. Adherence to a single political and economic thought—as defined by the Soviet 
government—solidified the Russian identity. Anton Shekhovtsov describes what are called 
“active measures,” direct methods used by the siloviki (security services) to ensure adherence to 
the Soviet institutions: 
     Active measures are implemented through 'actions aimed at creating agent positions in 
the enemy camp and its environment, playing operational games with the enemy directed 
at disinforming, discrediting, and corrupting enemy forces'. Oleg Kalugin, former Major 
General of the Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security, 
KGB), described active measures as ‘the heart and soul of the Soviet intelligence’...28 
 
 For the Soviet government, these measures were essential to maintaining a unified front 
against external oppression and preventing the humiliation they experienced under Tsarist 
regimes. Indeed, the hundred-year head start Western Europe had over Russia concerning the 
Enlightenment and industrialization only amplified distaste for the Tsar. Communism seemed to 
be a way for Russians to regain lost ground, and for that, unity was essential. According to 
Satter, the Russian desire for unity during Soviet rule stemmed from glorification of work—
which was performed only to advance the government’s agenda—as a replacement for “the 
relation between man and God.”29 
 Stability and security in Russia was at its weakest after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika dissolved Russian unity of thought and action 
as democratic ideologies flooded in. Russians, searching for a common sense of direction and a 
resurgence of Russian identity, looked to their cultural roots. William Pomeranz of The Kennan 
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Institute refers to the 1993 Russian constitution, which “speaks of the need to preserve Russia’s 
historic ‘state unity’ and of renewing its ‘sovereign statehood.’  Article 5, part 3 further declares 
that the federative make-up of the Russian Federation shall be based upon its ‘state integrity’ and 
the ‘unity of the system of state power.’”30 
 National identity is a major element of Russian foreign policy. The identity requires unity 
of thought—stability—and protection of all ethnic Russians, regardless of where they live. The 
implication, which Vladimir Putin used in the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, is that 
protecting the Russian national identity supersedes all other laws.31 Therefore, Putin argued that 
it was not only necessary, but his constitutional obligation to protect ethnic Russians abroad. The 
best form of protection, then, was annexing the area into the Russian Federation, bringing to bear 
on Ukraine all the Russian military, economic, and diplomatic might.  
 Protecting the Russian identity must be accomplished through any means necessary. 
Stalin killed millions of Russians to protect his version of the identity, and Putin followed suit 
through his actions in the Chechen wars, invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, and by what Satter 
asserts as a false flag attack by the FSB in the 1999 Russian apartment bombings that killed 293 
civilians.32 Out of this string of events the maskirovka concept comes into view. To James 
Roberts, maskirovka is a Soviet military doctrine consisting of “camouflage, deception, denial, 
subversion, sabotage, espionage, propaganda, and psychological operations.”33  
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Roberts recognized a shift from maskirovka’s former military role into a post-Soviet 
application in line with the Gerasimov doctrine: “The purpose of Maskirovka 2.0 is a bit 
different in that it is being used to achieve peacetime illegal political and geographic gains while 
staying below the threshold that would trigger any direct military response from the West.”34 
Valery Gerasimov, the Russian Federation’s General of the Army, argues that implementing 
maskirovka is merely a defensive quid pro quo: fighting asymmetric targets with their own 
weapons. “Long-distance, contactless actions against the enemy,” he wrote, “are becoming the 
main means of achieving combat and operational goals. The defeat of the enemy’s objects 
[objectives] is conducted throughout the entire depth of his territory.”35 Both maskirovka and the 
Gerasimov Doctrine are evaluated in the third chapter, “Russian Interference and the Gerasimov 
Doctrine.” 
The course of Russian history is tied to its concept of self-determination. The Russian 
people, in consolidating themselves under a national identity, believe their right to self-
determination is decided by the state—not the people. It seems a paradox to Western viewers, 
but from a Russian perspective the state provides the security and stability Russians deeply 
desire. As Pomeranz observed, “no matter what adjective one places in front of the term “state” 
in Imperial, Soviet, and post-Soviet history – absolutist, autocratic, socialist, totalitarian, secular, 
democratic – it is the state that always manages to survive.”36  
Therefore, it is the state that creates the Russian identity because the state protects its 
citizens and ensures their cultural legacy. In accomplishing those goals, the state is authorized to 
use any means necessary across any sector of its power, be it social, political, economic, or 
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military. Since the Russian state must protect the Russian identity, it views its claim as superior 
to any international boundary or law. In this context, maskirovka can be seen as a defensive 
measure. 
In using maskirovka against the United States, the Russian state prevents direct military 
conflict while protecting the Russian identity from what it sees as existential attacks on the 
state’s legitimacy. Because the state is the manifestation of the Russian identity, it must protect 
itself from assaults to its unities of thought and action. When the Russian state works to 
undermine Western institutions, it is—through an inverse relationship—legitimizing the Russian 
state as protector of the Russian identity. 
1.6  Assessment 
 
 The American and Russian interpretations of self-determination are well documented and 
researched. However, the implications of these origins into the Russian Federation’s relationship 
with the United States are not. Maskirovka itself is a likely factor for this gap, as it creates a fog 
over the policies, actions, and reactions of the Russian state. That is not to say it is the sole or 
primary factor, but at the very least one worth investigating. The United States, for its part, has 
succumb time and again to mirror imaging with its foreign policy that has similarly reduced 
cross-cultural understanding. Therefore, it was necessary to start from a much larger question: 
“What makes a state?” The belief in a society’s right to self-determination shows two diverging 
paths between the United States and Russia. The two paths refine the initial question into a 
direct, identifiable gap in knowledge: “What are the prospects and implications of future Russian 





 In the absence of substantial, published research on this question, this paper sought to 
understand the greater historical origins behind today’s interstate behavior. This resulted in the 
finding that both states can, for the majority of actions, derive their behavior from their 
respective concepts of the right to self-determination. In vying for ideological victory, the beliefs 
of the two states created a bipolar world that ruled the second half of the twentieth century. The 
remnants of that period are still evident, and relevant, today. 
The United States, throughout its history, embarked on a mission to spread democracy 
because it—partly due to American exceptionalism—believes the American interpretation of a 
liberal democracy to be the most effective form of government to launch international society 
into what Fukuyama believes “may constitute the ‘end point of mankind’s ideological evolution’ 
and the ‘final form of human government,’ and as such constituted the ‘end of history.’”37 
Interestingly, Fukuyama bases his argument on an end of the Hegelian dialectic, the very concept 
interpreted by Karl Marx that resulted in Soviet communism. In Fukuyama’s version, the end of 
the Hegelian dialectic comes about because “earlier forms of government were characterized by 
grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual collapse, [but] liberal democracy was 
arguably free from such fundamental internal contradictions.”38  
The clash of contradictions, or conflict of ideas, is essential to growing democracy. Marx, 
then, created a dialectic by opposing the Hegelian dialectic and submitting his own perspective. 
Whereas Hegel’s theory applies to ideologies, Marx believes “the ideal is nothing else than the 
material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.”39 It is 
intriguing that both the United States and Soviet Russia adopted very different interpretations of 
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Hegel’s dialectic. This paper views these interpretations as reflections of their respective 
identities. While Marx’s theories are not part of ethnic Russian history, their modification by 
Lenin, Stalin, and other Russians require noting. 
By applying these dialectics to United States and Russian foreign policy, the link 
strengthens between self-determination and foreign policy. In the United States, Hegelian 
ideological conflict, which Kissinger argues for in “a fundamental clash of ideologies,” fuels 
democratic debate while depressing material conflict, or in other words, war.40 The inverse is 
true in Russia: there is no significant ideological conflict due to national unity of thought, and 
thus material conflict is necessary to maintain the state’s legitimacy. Considering the constant 
combat American forces have seen compared to much smaller Russian actions, this seems 
counter-intuitive. However, this conventional wisdom neglects to include Russian maskirovka, 
which brings all facets of life into the context of war. It is a material war where the ideas are 
ammunition, and the weapons are the elements of society: media, government, economy, 
nationalism. If the United States seeks to spread democracy to lessen the chances of war, then it 
is necessary for Russia to upset this narrative to protect its national identity. 
1.7  Conclusion 
 
Shekhovtsov, through his in-depth analysis of Russian relationships with far-right 
political movements, identifies a portion of Russian influence in the West. He also recognizes a 
gap, necessitating “further, more narrow research into this phenomenon and its particular 
aspects.”41 National identity plays a large part in maskirovka because identity is a conduit that 
can be used to divide opinions in liberal societies. Maskirovka itself is documented in Russian 
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military texts—and alluded to in the Gerasimov Doctrine—but the reasons for its application are 
not. Media outlets refer to Russian misinformation campaigns in national elections, but the 
“why” is often only summarized as advancing Russian foreign policy. The broad explanation 
implies a lack of understanding, to which this paper proposes additional research. 
It is not enough to study the methods of maskirovka, as intelligence agencies around the 
world are likely doing. Additional questions must be asked: What is the “end goal” of these 
efforts? If there are no limits to the extent of maskirovka, what can the United States do counter 
it? How can the two opposing schools of thought—the United States and Russia—identify their 
respective contradictions and create a dialectical solution? 
This paper identified the causal links between each state’s concept of self-determination 
and their behavior toward each other. In the United States, a quest toward equality and liberty for 
all created a belief that liberal democracy is the safest, most egalitarian option for international 
relations. The United States endeavors to spread liberal democracy to all states because “the 
fundamentally un-warlike character of liberal societies is evident in the extraordinarily peaceful 
relations they maintain among one another.”42 
Russia, throughout its varied systems of government, grew from a foundation of the need 
for stability and security. Protecting the Russian national identity required “the disregard for the 
individual in the face of the need to realize the tasks of the state.”43 In doing so, the Russian state 
created maskirovka to discredit and dissuade adversaries from challenging the Russian national 
identity. In practice, maskirovka is an extension of the Russian interpretation of self-
determination in that it is a defensive mechanism directed at threats to the stability and security 
of the Russian state—which is, in fact, the Russian identity
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Nationalism in Russian Foreign Policy 
 
2.1  Abstract 
 
This paper finds Russian nationalism has significant benefits for Russian President 
Vladimir Putin’s regime in the short-term, but creates the potential for severe consequences in 
the long term as his base becomes disillusioned. The disillusionment is likely caused by Russia’s 
inability to fully commit militarily to regain what nationalists perceive as lost Russian territory in 
Ukraine. Such a military commitment would result in harsh Western responses that Putin cannot 
risk and thus leaves the Russian nationalist base feeling unfulfilled and disenfranchised. In 
Ukraine, Russian nationalism will be part of the equation in Ukraine’s future decision concerning 
its relationship with Russia, as attrition through the current conflict can only lead to a Ukrainian 





2.2  Introduction 
 
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s domestic approval is a well-known aspect of Russian 
society, yet debate continues on how he uses that support and whether it is his own creation or a 
pre-existing Russian condition. This paper views Putin’s foreign policy toward Ukraine through 
the lens of Russian nationalism to better understand the intricacies involved. It seeks to answer, 
in part, a call from academics for a new conceptual approach to Russian foreign policy.1 While 
the standard Western view is of Russian aggression as a return to former glory, this paper instead 
views Russian foreign policy as a means to retain its identity in a progressive world. By using 
nationalism to justify its actions in Ukraine, Putin inadvertently opened the Russian Federation to 
destruction from within. In what is an ironic twist of fate, the same justifications Putin used for 
annexing Crimea can be used by disparate Russian societies to secede from the Russian 
Federation. Therefore, Russian nationalism has a significant impact on Russian foreign policy 
toward Ukraine. Nationalist sentiment is integral to the stability and security of the Putin-led 
Russian government. 
2.3  Methodology 
 
To evaluate Russian nationalism, this paper identifies differing views on its origins and 
uses. Prominent research behind these views are grouped into four divisions to understand how 
each viewpoint interacts with the others. Next, these viewpoints are applied to various Russian-
Ukrainian events in recent history: Euromaidan, the Crimean referendum, and separatist 
movements in the Eastern Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk. This paper finds the most 
probable source of nationalism comes from the top and is disseminated to the public in the form 
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of a “Russian Idea” which feeds on grassroots nationalist sentiment already prevalent in Russian 
society. The modern “Russian Idea” is Putin’s Russia: united under a common history and 
culture against ideological challenges from the West. The most significant Western challenge 
this paper investigates is of a culturally blended society that derives its strength from its diversity 
of thought. Unity of thought in the “Russian Idea” is a core tenet to regime stability and their 
domestic perception of a return to Russian prosperity with Putin at its helm. This top-down 
nationalism is then used for what this paper terms defensive nationalism, a method that slows 
adversarial decision-making processes and creates a permissive operating environment for non-
military Russian national powers. Most prevalent of these powers is information warfare and a 
non-linear approach to conflict via the Gerasimov Doctrine. 
Finally, this paper puts the top-down, defensive nationalism construct into context for 
both Russia and Ukraine. Doing so brings to light weaknesses and strengths in nationalism’s use, 
and shows how it can threaten Russia in the future. By misinterpreting historical contexts, Putin 
created the potential justification for groups within Russia to secede. In a best-case scenario for 
Putin’s Russia, he will need to shift away from nationalist messages while the Russian economy 
and demographics continue to suffer. Otherwise, Putin’s domestic messaging that capitalizes on 
nationalistic goals could result in frustration and a loss of confidence in Putin by his base and 





Figure 1: Origins and Uses of Nationalism 
 
2.4  Literature Review 
 
There are four competing schools of thought regarding nationalism as a contributor to 
Russian foreign policy toward Ukraine. These four schools are depicted in Figure 1 as X and Y 
axes on a graph. For the X axis, Russian nationalism can be seen as defensive or offensive in 
nature. The defensive camp sees Russian foreign policy as a tool to fend off invaders, 
specifically the Western powers of the United States (U.S.) and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO).2 These invaders are directly attacking a “Fortress Russia” while 
simultaneously chipping away at Russia’s self-proclaimed sphere of influence.3 The opposing 
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camp—and typically a view held by Western viewers—is an offensively-postured Russian 
foreign policy that uses nationalist rhetoric to justify Russia’s “Right to Protect” Russian citizens 
abroad.4 In doing so, this viewpoint attributes Russian actions to expansionist desires, seeking to 
overturn the status quo in Eastern Europe and assert a “great power” role.5 Russia seeks to 
accomplish this by referencing historical concepts and norms, the most tangible of these being 
“Novorossiya” and the annexation of Crimea.6 
The Y axis concerns where and how this nationalist thought originates: distributed 
downward by elites through propaganda, or spreading upward from grassroots nationalist 
movements as a result of decades of perceived injustices. The trickle-down nationalism asserts 
Putin cultivated nationalism through propaganda and rhetoric that frames the West as 
antagonistic. The gradual shift of Putin from center-right to the right, from 2000 to the present 
day, may be a calculated move to retain power, appease possible revolutionary forces within 
Russia, and manipulate populist sentiment to drive foreign policy. Conversely, the grassroots 
origin theory sees the Russian elites use of nationalism as a byproduct of greater societal change 
at the lowest levels.7 This belief draws from various other grassroots uprisings in recent history, 
from the Arab Spring in the Middle East to the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan in Ukraine.8 
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2.2.1  Russian Defensive Nationalism 
 
Nationalism with defensive justifications is more internationally acceptable than 
offensive justifications because it removes the aggressive connotation of forcing outside entities 
to accept the nationalist view. Typically, it is isolationist and focuses inward at internal divides, 
while some theorize Western expansion is causing a rise in Russian aggression.9 Tsygankov 
argues for the preservation of cultural identity—specifically Russian language, norms, and 
accepted practices—and ties it to historical ownership of geographical areas.10 In conjunction 
with this inward-looking belief, defensive nationalism blames outside actors for events that 
discredit Russian governmental activities or disrupt Russian society, with the predominant bad 
actor being the historically familiar U.S. and NATO.11 Should an event outside Russia threaten 
their culture, this camp believes Russia is justified in defending Russians abroad as a defensive 
measure against external existential threats—a key point in Prime Minister Medvedev’s speech 
concerning the Russian deployment to Crimea prior to its annexation.12 
2.2.3  Russian Offensive Nationalism 
 
On the other hand, offensive nationalism views this right to protect as an aggressive, 
expansionist tool to regain lost ground of former Russian lands from both Tsarist and Soviet 
periods, of which Aleksandr Dugin is a major proponent.13 Dugin expands on this nationalist 
philosophy, and calls for a return of isolated cultures, at the same time calling for an end to 
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nationalism and a unity of being dictated by “our peoples, our countries, and our civilisations.”14 
The concept of Novorossiya, or New Russia, derives its strength from the shared identity of 
Eastern Ukrainians—39% of Luhansk and 38% of Donetsk oblasts identify as ethnic Russians—
with Russia, similar to Crimea in 2014.15 These two areas, Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, are 
prime examples of offensive nationalism used in Russian foreign policy toward Ukraine. 
2.2.3  Nationalism from the Top Down 
 
Russian nationalism’s use in foreign policy finds its strongest argument in a “top-down” 
structure: Rhetoric, goals, and initiatives are created at the highest levels, and then disseminated 
to the Russian people for consumption. In their interviews of Russian students, Kasamara and 
Sorokina found that propaganda—or state-sponsored media outlets—had the largest effect on 
political perceptions.16 The propaganda drew on defensive nationalist sentiments: historical 
grievances, dated attitudes and opinions from the Cold War, and the perception of a Russian 
culture under siege by the West.17 These attitudes toward Ukraine changed with the narrative 
provided by the Russian state media as Russia dealt with various Ukrainian presidents and their 
friendliness—or lack thereof—toward Russia.18 This top-down use of nationalism created 
substantial Russian public support for the 2008 Georgian War, which tested the “right to protect” 
concept on the international stage. Allison believed, correctly, that this logic would be used in 
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future conflicts because it provided enough gray-area legality on definitions of citizens and self-
determination to normalize its use.19 By declaring Georgian citizens to be of ethnic Russian 
origin, Russia tapped into the nationalist sentiment of protecting its own people against all 
enemies. This same argument was used in annexing Crimea six years later.20 
2.2.4  Nationalism from The Ground Up 
 
A grassroots source of Russian nationalism would fall in line with the global phenomena 
between 2004 and 2014. The common argument identified in a meta-analysis of Russian 
citizens’ views were ones of historic distrust of the West that were at least partially based on a 
lack of understanding of Western entities like NATO.21 A separate study found that  “historical 
ignorance” among young Russians contributed to their acceptance of Russian state media.22 Far-
right nationalist movements, like Dugin’s, feel that Putin doesn’t go far enough with his policies, 
giving credence to the notion that Putin only uses nationalist sentiment when it is convenient to 
him.23 However, Suslov and Szostek separately argue that grassroots nationalism is not effective 
in altering Russian foreign policy or forcing the Russian government to change its course.24 With 
that in mind, it is important to note that “top-down” nationalism would not work without at least 
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a basic form of grassroots nationalist beliefs from which elites could form the basis of effective 
messaging. 
2.3  Russian Foreign Policy Through a Nationalist Lens 
 
The Russian government uses nationalism to provide acceptable justifications to its 
citizens for its actions outside Russia. First, Russian government officials cite notable historical 
cultural figures in official addresses. These figures typically espouse a larger national entity than 
current Russian borders. Second, the Russian government compares its people to “little 
Russians:” a derogatory Russian phrase for Ukrainians and Belorussians to show that Russia as 
an idea is greater than the state.25 Third, Russian nationalism appeases a desire to increase 
national credibility on the world stage. The states of the former Soviet Union are generally 
regarded as belonging to Russia’s current sphere of influence.26 Fourth, nationalism helps justify 
claims to a right of self-determination by groups wishing to align with Russia. This is most 
evident in the Russian justifications for the 2014 Crimea annexation and 2008 Georgian War 
invasion.  
These four points draw on the top-down theory for spreading nationalism and are backed 
by defensive statements to delay international actions that could stop Russian intervention. For 
Ukraine, it is especially relevant because it shares a 1,000-year history with the Rus civilization, 
the genesis of both Ukraine and Russia. Russian nationalism is dangerous when used as a soft 
power foreign policy tool against Ukraine because it attacks the social fabric within Ukraine. 
Ukraine is visibly divided by culture: language, religion, views of Russia and the West, all 
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follow the same general fault lines between Eastern and Central Ukraine.27 Russia exploits this 
divide by tailoring its messaging to adopt these nationalist sentiments and refer back to periods 
of Russian unification as a call to support the Russian government in expanding its influence 
abroad.  
2.3.1  Protecting Historical Territory 
 
History is a major facet of the Russian identity: Putin refers to Prince Vladimir as a 
reminder of Crimea’s importance to Russians.28 This is an attempt to justify to the world that 
Russia is not only a sovereign state, but a civilization that has historical rights to lands outside its 
current border. To this end, calls from Russian officials for returning Crimea and “Novorossiya” 
to Russia evoke nationalist sentiments among ethnic Russians.29 There is, however, a significant 
threat: if the Russian government cannot deliver on these demands, they risk losing the support 
of their right-leaning political base. 
This threat is already coming to fruition in Ukraine: fighting in the East is at a relative 
stalemate. While this is precisely the outcome the Russian government wants, it will not satisfy 
the portion of their base that wants to re-unite the area with Russia. A low-intensity conflict 
stalemate prevents Ukraine from joining the EU and NATO, thus leaving it to fend for itself and 
increasing its vulnerability to Russian interference.30  
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Re-claiming and protecting historical territory creates additional legal issues for Russia. 
First, what international legal claim does Russia have to areas owned by former Russian systems 
of government, and what international body would recognize it? The Russian Federation is not a 
continuation of the communist Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), it is—by its own 
admission—a democratic federal republic. Moreover, to lay claim to area owned by governments 
twice removed, in this case Tsarist Russia, further stretches any legal interpretations the Russian 
Federation may provide to the world regarding continuity of ownership.  
Second, who or what governmental body in Ukraine allows for a legal secession of 
Eastern Ukraine? If this cannot be accomplished by a legal and democratic vote, what 
justification will Russia provide for interfering with an internal Ukrainian civil war? The current 
Russian argument is multifaceted but centers predominantly on its self-professed right to protect 
Russians anywhere in the world.31 This argument directly ties nationalist ideology to concerns 
about a perceived threat to Russian identity: because Ukrainians share a very intimate history 
with Russians and are culturally similar, the ongoing revolutions in Ukraine risk spreading into 
the Russian diaspora. 
2.3.2  Cultural Similarities: The Risk to the Russian Idea 
 
The Russian government’s fear that a revolution in Ukraine against kleptocracy could 
spread to Russia is well founded. Human rights repression, corruption, economic stagnation, and 
a patrimonial business system risk inflaming social-class tensions in Russia, as it did in Ukraine. 
Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation applies here.32 First, Ukraine as a whole is geographically 
and culturally closer to Western Europe by way of Central Europe and could more readily see the 
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difference in quality of life between the democratic West and formerly-communist East. Second, 
the civilizational divide within Ukraine further agitated the perception of relative deprivation: 
Ukrainians in Western Ukraine adopted democratic, progressive ideas and began to seek 
Ukrainian induction into Western institutions—namely NATO and the EU. Eastern Ukrainians, 
more culturally tied to Russia, viewed these events as encroaching on their Ukrainian identity 
and sought to protect it.  
It is in this way that Ukraine is a true cultural threat to Russia. The Russian Idea that 
Putin draws heavily on in his speeches proposes that Western and Russian ideals are insoluble. 
The Russian Idea is a nationalist tool to solidify all of Russia under a shared Russian identity 
without regard to country of origin: an individual who culturally identifies as Russian is a part of 
the Russian Idea by default.33 It is the basis from which the Russian government created its 
domestic messaging about “Fortress Russia,” right to protect, Novorossiya, and the Crimean 
annexation. The Russian Idea is a probable driver for Putin’s lofty approval ratings. It focuses 
domestic attention away from a dismal outlook that includes a declining population, severe 
alcohol abuse, poor healthcare, corruption, and political repression. By attributing Russian 
internal problems to external actors, Putin can solidify Russians against Western beliefs. The 
weakness to the Russian Idea lies in Ukraine’s unique position between Russia and the West: 
because of their close cultural ties, Ukraine is the measuring stick against which Russians can 
measure their relative quality of life.34 
Should NATO and the EU absorb Ukraine, the adoption of Western practices—especially 
economic and legal processes that reduce corruption, patrimonial influence, and expand human 
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rights—Ukrainian standards of living could slowly rise to that of its Western neighbors. 
Russians, seeing these improvements in quality of life, would likewise feel deprived under the 
Russian Idea and seek adoption of Western ideals. This is what the Russian government fears. As 
enmity increases between Russia and Ukraine, it is possible Ukraine will shift further West.35 
Putin, through his promotion of the Russian Idea, risks losing Russian approval as Russians look 
to reduce their relative deprivation with Ukrainians. For Putin and the Russian government, such 
an event would likely equate to the collapse of the USSR. 
Therefore, Putin must ensure the Russian Idea—and by proxy, the Russian government—
cannot be threatened. Russian nationalism is the most efficient and low-risk option available for 
this defense. It provides arguments for defending the Russian people, thus keeping his base 
appeased, while giving enough murky justification to the international community to confuse, 
restrict, delay, and prevent outside intervention. The Russian Idea, as a nationalist tool, gives 
Putin the flexibility he needs to execute foreign policy and maintain the Russian sphere of 
influence. 
2.3.3  Maintaining the Sphere of Influence 
 
The existential threat to the Russian government should not be taken lightly by the West 
because it has significant implications for how Russia will interact on the world stage. Putin 
cannot afford to allow Ukraine to join Western institutions—and not because of the threat of 
NATO bases on its borders. The physical threat of Western militaries is an outdated 
misconception that Russian nationalist sentiment takes advantage of: the amount of military 
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equipment required to directly threaten the entire Russian military is far beyond what NATO 
could realistically stage at permanent bases in Ukraine. Both Russia and NATO have sufficient 
means to destroy each other from their current geographical positions. While a close physical 
presence of NATO on Russian borders would certainly have a psychological effect on Russians, 
the fear of such a situation is more useful in stoking domestic Russian support for Putin’s 
government.  
Putin and the Russian government are intrinsically tied to the Russian Idea—it is what 
has sustained the social cohesiveness after the collapse of the USSR and tumultuous post-Soviet 
period of the 1990s. Protecting the government is akin to protecting the Russian way of life, with 
the relationship between the two possibly reflected in Putin’s approval ratings. It is logical, then, 
that both Putin and Russian nationalists would align in pursuit of that defense.36 With a very real 
threat to this way of life filtering through many former Soviet countries, it is again logical that 
both parties would focus their efforts in this space. What is perceived in the West as a return to a 
Soviet Russian sphere of influence as a form of neo-imperialist expansionism could be viewed 
instead as a security measure for regime continuity.37 There is a small but significant difference 
between the two views: the predominant Western view is one of Russian aggression to force 
Western acquiescence in Eastern European affairs, while the Russian perspective is the limited 
use of national powers to maintain and protect stability in Russia. 
Russia’s small sphere of influence is more susceptible to its national powers partly 
because of their geographical closeness, but more so due to cultural similarities and shared 
history with Russians. If the Russian “Gerasimov Doctrine” is to be believed, and there is a solid 
argument that it should be, then we should expect to see a non-linear (or asymmetric) approach 
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to Russian foreign policy.38 Typical Russian actions include cyber-attacks, “gray-area” warfare, 
energy grid disruption, and heavy use of propaganda through misinformation and disinformation 
campaigns. Allison believes that traditional warfare would be unappealing because “senior 
Russian officers originally trained in Soviet military academies alongside officers from the 
Ukrainian Union Republic can hardly welcome the reality of combat with the ‘fraternal’ 
Ukrainian people, which offers neither recognition, career advancement nor a sense of personal 
accomplishment.”39 Open conflict between Russia and Ukraine would expose Russia to possible 
direct Western military intervention with little or no benefit to regime stability. A cultural 
understanding of the interactions between Russia and Ukraine is therefore vital for Western 
states and institutions in applying their foreign policy to accomplish their own goals. To that end, 
there is a significant flaw in Putin’s argument for Crimea’s right of self-determination: it can just 
as easily be applied in Russia. 
2.3.4  Right of Self-Determination 
 
In March 2014, Putin asserted Crimea had the right to vote for secession from Ukraine 
without acceptance from the Ukrainian government.40 He justified this with the democratic ideal 
of a people’s right to self-determination—a critical element to both US and French revolutions in 
the 1700s. However, Putin’s argument was critically flawed. In supporting Crimea’s secession, 
however forced and illegal it may have been, he established a precedent for other peoples to 
secede from non-aligned parent governments. More to the point, disparate communities within 
the Russian Federation now have a basic framework to organize their own secessions from 
 
38 For an evaluation of the Gerasimov Doctrine in foreign policy, see Chapter Three of this thesis. See also 
Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (February 2016): 23–29. 
39 Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the Rules,” 1281-2. 




Russia. As previously mentioned, the Russian Idea is critical to maintaining regime continuity. 
Putin has, in effect, given Russian citizens who feel they do not fit into the Russian Idea an 
opportunity to revolt. 
The Russian Idea, Russian society, and Russian culture are three overlapping elements 
that form the social fabric of the Russian Federation. Russian society is more clearly divided than 
the Idea, as Siberian, central steppes, Caucasus, and Muscovite regions are distinctly different.41 
Likewise, Russian culture is not uniform across Russia: traditions, mores, values, and religion 
vary significantly. If the Russian Idea is meant to encompass and unify both the entirety of 
Russia and areas outside its borders, then fragmentation of the Idea could create a cascading 
collapse of not only this identity but the state itself. It seems a significant oversight on Putin’s 
part to relate the Crimean right of self-determination to states whose creation involved the 
removal of an oppressive and unwanted parent state.  
2.4  What Does Nationalism Accomplish for Russia? 
 
There is a significant threat to Putin’s regime continuity embedded in using Russian 
nationalism as a foreign policy tool. Leaders of hyper-nationalist movements, such as Chechen 
leader Ramzan Kadyrov, may take advantage of Putin’s nationalist messaging and use it to work 
against the Russian government.42 Kadyrov serves a purpose in the “Russian Idea”: he controls 
and violently suppresses anti-establishment sentiment to maintain order in an area notorious for 
separatist movements against Russia. Applying these brute force techniques to future separatist 
movements in Russia risks alienating significant portions of its population. Different 
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interpretations of stability and security—in nationalist contexts—are likely causes of fracturing a 
united Russian nationalist message. In Ukraine, “institutional preferences of citizens were more 
likely to connect to certain group identities (especially ethnicity) and particular ideological 
orientations towards Ukraine’s place in the world, the ethnic basis of citizenship and the 
market.”43 Because Putin ties Russian and Ukrainian ethnicities together by their shared cultural 
history, this existential threat becomes a plausible risk to his regime’s continuity.  
Until such fracturing occurs, if it occurs at all, Putin can use nationalist rhetoric to justify 
foreign policy to his domestic audience while delaying negative reactions internationally. Putin 
can tailor the government’s messaging to address both shortcomings at home and necessary 
Russian actions abroad. During periods of stymied economic growth, he blames Western 
sanctions instead of addressing the reason for those sanctions—except for his spokesman to label 
them “unjustified and illegal asset freezes under the guise of sanctions.”44 Within the construct of 
Ends-Ways-Means, nationalism is a means organized through the ways of information warfare to 
accomplish the ends of Russian foreign policy objectives. 
2.4.1  Russia's Quest for Validation 
 
Validation of Russia as a great power is another important factor to the “Russia Idea” 
where nationalism plays a role.45 In the Russian quest to return to great power status, Putin uses 
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nationalism and the “fortress Russia” concept to align Russian citizens to his world-view. This 
alignment plays off an already deep-seated notion “that Russia is encircled by a group of 
enemies, led by the United States.”46 By projecting power outward, Putin accomplishes two 
objectives. First, it provides validation that Russia is no longer in the weakened state it found 
itself post-Soviet collapse. Second, it fuels a top-down, defensive nationalist perspective where 
Putin leads the fight against Western oppression and exploitation of that previously-weak 
Russian state. However, annexing new areas based on an argument of historical ownership or 
relations does not mesh well with a modern “fortress Russia” argument: Russia cannot claim 
both a return to centuries-old territorial boundaries and a defense of modern-day borders. 
The potential for internal contradictions among these two viewpoints can divide the 
nationalist base along the defensive and offensive fault lines. By promoting both ideologies, 
Putin unifies Russian citizens in the short-term. As the differing goals become realized—or fail 
to be realized—those divisions will become clearer. Dugin, a proponent of a more imperialist 
Russia, risks separating his base from Putin’s message if Putin fails to fulfill his messaging to 
Dugin’s satisfaction.47 Putin will need to manage the expectations of these disparate groups in 
the long-term to maintain regime stability, a risk he recognized publicly in 2014.48  
2.4.2  Right to Protect Geopolitical Realignment 
 
As an instrument of nationalism in foreign policy, Russia’s “right to protect” narrative 
has significant implications on the geopolitical stage. According to Tsygankov, Putin’s mid-
2000s shift toward an anti-Western approach welcomed Russian nationalists to his narrative, 
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with Ukraine as his “last stand against global American hegemony.”49 Putin’s “right to protect” 
justification of military intervention in the 2008 Georgian War and the 2014 Crimean annexation 
tested its international acceptance. In both cases, the international response was tepid—there was 
no direct military action taken to combat Russian aggression. A lack of international response 
validated Putin’s argument, giving it a form of precedent and enabling him to use this narrative 
for future justification.50 Establishing a precedent for a “right to protect” plays into Putin’s 
“Russian Idea:” Russia is greater than its state borders and is justified in protecting the Idea in 
any situation and location. 
The “right to protect,” then, is a geopolitical realignment in Russia’s favor. It casts off the 
accepted international standards of rule of law and state sovereignty. It provides enough gray 
area justification that stymies international response to Russian aggression.51 Finally, it boosts 
the Russian domestic perception of Russia as a great power because it can affect and manipulate 
internal affairs of other sovereign states in ways Russians attribute to the West. Combined, these 
elements give Putin enough leeway to execute his foreign policy without needing to worry about 
an international military response, setting a dangerous precedent for the future. 
2.4.3  Neo-Imperialism 
 
Using the “right to protect” narrative helps expand Russia’s sphere of influence across its 
near abroad. Expanding their sphere of influence is itself a contradiction to Putin’s defensive 
nationalism argument: if Russia seeks only to retain its current status, why does it need to expand 
its influence? Doing so shifts the geopolitical landscape in Central and Eastern Europe by 
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upsetting the norm and returning to an imperialist perspective akin to the Soviet era. Soviet 
Russia was imperialist in the sense that it sought to control states within its purview and exploit 
their resources for Russian gains. Stalin’s collectivization of farmlands eradicated 3.9 million 
Ukrainians in the 1930s, a point in history that still causes significant contention between Russia 
and Ukraine today.52 
In modern Ukraine, there are signs that Russia again seeks to control its neighbors. The 
continuing low-intensity conflict in Eastern Ukraine prevents Ukrainian applications into NATO 
and the EU, forcing them to fend for themselves. In doing so, Russia can flex its economic power 
over Ukraine to maintain Russian influence. Russian nationalism serves as a conduit for a 
Russian neo-imperialist argument; because Ukraine is beholden to Russian interests and 
historical ownership, it is therefore appropriate for Russia to restrict Ukrainian access to Western 
organizations.53 
2.4.4  Controlling the Narrative 
 
The narrative is essential to the Putin regime’s legitimacy and continuity. Putin must 
balance the far-right elements like Dugin and Kadyrov with more internationally-acceptable 
foreign policy. However, Putin cannot maintain both in the long-term: appeasing one will result 
in the upset of the other. Likewise, he cannot maintain a middle ground between the two 
eternally. Should Putin attempt to balance the two, he risks disenfranchising his base with failed 
promises or upsetting the international norm to such an extent that they respond with force.  
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In the near-term, Putin’s use of a zero-sum argument toward NATO keeps the far-right in 
line. The far-right view NATO as a historical enemy to Russian power, a cultural element that 
Putin uses domestically to great effect.54 At the same time, Putin disappointed the far-right by 
not officially recognizing Eastern Ukrainian separatist movements and not intervening with 
direct and overt military support.55 Regardless of which side Putin chooses to appeal to, there is a 
common trend: the enemy is always external to Russia. In 2009, Allison predicted Russia would 
use an external threat to Russians abroad as pretext for intervention.56 Since 2008, Putin has used 
the “right to protect” argument in his narratives to normalize nationalist foreign policy. 
There are solutions to Putin’s balancing problem outside acquiescing to one side or the 
other. Putin can capitalize on the differences of one far-right nationalist with another and present 
either side as an avenue for an external actor who seeks to threaten the “Russian Idea.” For 
example, if Kadyrov begins to challenge Putin’s authority outside Chechnya, Putin could cast 
him as an Islamic extremist affiliated with an external terrorist organization, and deploy Russian 
forces to Chechnya and remove Kadyrov and his enforcers. While the scenario may not be likely, 
it is plausible and retains the general Russian nationalist rhetoric. In a similar fashion, if Putin 
can maintain steady economic growth for Russia as a whole, much of the internal issues can be 
dismissed as unimportant to Russian life in relation to economic prosperity. 
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2.5  Conclusion 
 
As White et al identified, economic success on Russia’s part may have a positive effect 
on retaining these disparate Russian peoples.57 If these successes do not continue while access to 
information increases, these disaffected groups may adopt anti-Russian views.58 The Russian 
government faces a tenuous future if economic growth slows and its citizens grow tired of 
conflicts that do not benefit them. To mitigate this, Putin will again need to shift the domestic 
focus toward a new external problem while drawing down on the need to reclaim historical 
territories and unite Russians in and out of the state.  
This shift will have a few indicators for observers. First, Putin’s ties to nationalist Russian 
ideas may shift in either direction, but likely toward a more centrist position. Shifting to a far-
right nationalist position would require Putin to use national powers at a level that would almost 
certainly draw direct Western intervention, which the Russian government would not be able to 
compete against directly. Second, disparate groups—to include far-right nationalists—in Russia 
may become more outspoken and possibly violent if they perceive the new direction to be 
counter to their interpretation of the Russian Idea. It is also possible that some of these groups 
become disillusioned with the Russian Idea entirely. Third, in response to the above, the Russian 
security services would likely re-enact more brutal measures to repress the protests and prevent 
them from spreading, similar to security crackdowns common in the Caucasus regions. Finally, 
oligarchs may begin withdrawing their support from Putin and redistributing their finances 
outside Russia. During previous times of economic stress, Putin has called for Russians to return 
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money to Russian banks.59 If oligarchs separate themselves from Putin during such a crisis, it 
would further exacerbate financial stress on the Russian government. 
Using nationalism as a tool for foreign policy gave Putin significant elasticity in the 
short-term but creates multiple scenarios where it may rebound negatively. He uses a top-down 
defensive nationalist approach to slow negative reactions while tapping into a latent nationalist 
base that gives Putin legitimacy on both domestic and international stages. Russian nationalism 
significantly affects Ukrainians because of their intertwined cultural history and geographically 
important location. The location is not as important in a military sense as it is in acting as an 
ideological buffer between Western ideals that run counter to the Russian Idea. Putin must 
protect this sphere of influence while finding creative ways to show domestic economic progress, 
or risk losing his support. A lack of faith in Putin has greater negative implications on faith in the 
Russian Idea because Putin is the embodiment of the Idea in modern-day Russia. If the cohesion 
in Russia under the Russian Idea deteriorates, the impact of domestic society on governance 
increases, lessening the power of the government.60  
Ukraine is in a unique position: it straddles the division between Western and Russian 
ideologies that carry with them serious first, second, and third order effects on how Ukraine’s 
future will unfold. It cannot combat Russia directly, and it has no safe solution to its problems. If 
it aligns with the West and joins the EU or NATO, Russia will certainly use all of its non-
military national powers to decimate the Ukrainian economy. If it acquiesces to Russia, Ukraine 
can abandon any hope of retaining sovereignty over its internal affairs. As Oppenheimer et al 
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wrote, “Ukraine cannot go it alone and will need to make a geopolitical choice in the near 
future.”61
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Russian Interference and the Gerasimov Doctrine 
 
3.1  Abstract 
 This paper addresses a deficiency in the Western approach to Russian foreign policy and 
its interference in sovereign states. Through an application of the Russian Gerasimov Doctrine, 
this paper measures a variety of foreign policy actions from Russia, alongside the responses of 
the target country, as a comparative case study. The Gerasimov Doctrine views diplomatic and 
military actions as equivalent foreign policy tools on a shared scale of escalation of force. To 
evaluate these actions, this paper divides them into three spheres of power: social, information, 
and military. Through this lens, Russian foreign policy actions—and thus the level of aggression 
in its interference of other states’ affairs—is inversely related to the target country’s ability and 
willingness to retaliate within each sphere (or across multiple spheres) in a manner that would 




3.2  Introduction 
 
 Russian interference in sovereign states’ domestic affairs is a fact of 21st century politics. 
Current investigations into Russian actions evaluate the effects of this interference on the target 
state's activities; they do not focus on the extent to which Russian interference accomplishes 
Russian foreign policy goals within a targeted state. It is for this reason this paper asks the 
question: how does Russia's implementation of its foreign policy alter political behavior of 
adversarial states to accomplish Russian foreign policy goals? Determining precise foreign 
policy goals outside of documents released for public consumption is a murky and difficult 
process due to national security concerns.  
Current Russian doctrine is an evolution of Soviet doctrine. There are a few key concepts 
and doctrines that help us understand Russian interference from the Russian perspective. First, a 
Soviet military doctrine of military denial and deception—called maskirovka—is the cornerstone 
of current policies of dis- and misinformation. From various Russian wars in the late 1990s to 
today, maskirovka doctrine contributed to success on the battlefield and in international media 
through disputing or conflating Western findings.44 In 2013, Russian General Valery Gerasimov 
shaped maskirovka into a non-physical tool to support Russian foreign policy, a document many 
in the West call the “Gerasimov Doctrine.” While the concepts of denial and deception are at 
least as old as Sun Tzu, Gerasimov's correlation of nonviolent foreign policy tools—such as 
sanctions, removal of diplomats, and official condemnations—to kinetic military action on an 
ever-shifting scale of war is a different approach to the same goal of war as the United States: “to 
impose our will on the enemy.”45 The Gerasimov Doctrine provides a perspective from which an 
 
44 RT, “MH17 Might Have Been Shot Down From Air – Chief Dutch Investigator,” RT, October 27, 
2014, https://www.rt.com/news/199891-dutch-investigation-mh17-crash/ (accessed October 12, 2017). 




observer can view state actions on the world stage, it is not a playbook for Russian military 
actions. 
With that in mind, we are better equipped to evaluate what Russia—through the writings 
of its senior doctrinal strategist—deems as Western aggression, and then look to measure the 
successes and failures of Russian responses as it seeks to accomplish its foreign policy goals. 
Three major ongoing cases of Russian interference are evaluated here: actions against the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. This comparative case study seeks to identify Russian 
foreign policy goals toward these three states, and to determine whether those goals were 
accomplished.  
For the purposes of this study, Russian and target country foreign policies are evaluated 
through the lens of the Gerasimov Doctrine. Similarly, capabilities of adversarial states toward 
Russia are evaluated according to Gerasimov's defined “primary phases (stages) of conflict 
development.”46 This paper divides the capabilities into three spheres of power: social, 
information, and military. As with the Gerasimov Doctrine, these spheres overlap, but providing 
general divisions between different forms of power creates a measurable base for this 
exploratory research.  
Figure 2 is a translated version of Gerasimov’s concept of escalation of force. It 
encompasses a variety of soft and hard power measures along a shared scale of aggression. The 
Gerasimov Doctrine is not a tool, but a measuring stick we can use to understand foreign policy 
actions from a Russian perspective. This paper contends that in a comparison of state behavior 
following Russian interference, states with less capability to impose their will on Russia are 
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more susceptible to forceful Russian interference than states with a greater capability to impose 
their will on Russia. 
Figure 2: The Gerasimov Doctrine47 
 
 




3.3  Literature Review 
 
There are two common schools of thought regarding Russian interference: a perspective 
from the West (loosely defined here as NATO and U.S.-aligned nations), and the stance of the 
Russian Federation. The Western perspective maintains Russian interference “efforts have 
“weaponized” four spheres of activity: traditional and social media, ideology and culture, crime 
and corruption, and energy.”48 Dutch government reports, based on investigations from their 
intelligence service, describe Russian actions as “an attempt to undermine the democratic 
process,”49 an important distinction. The democratic process, by its very nature, allows input 
from any perspective. For the West, this is both a strength, in terms of egalitarianism, and a 
weakness, in its susceptibility to malign influence.  
Because Western democracies espouse freedom of speech and press, they are prime 
targets for misinformation (altering facts) and disinformation (creating false facts). On a related 
note, Stephen Walt believes past wars are useful indicators for future behavior, in that the 
experiences gained in war can shape their foreign policy for decades.50 These two thoughts are 
tied together through Russian experiences following the collapse of the Soviet Union: their 
“loss” of the Cold War, and subsequent restructuring of their social order, saw a brief influx of 
Western ideals that disrupted the status quo. Western schools of thought—democracy and 
capitalism—challenged Russian social ties. These are now viewed as historical examples of 
Western campaigns to interfere in internal Russian affairs. This theme provided Russian 
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President Vladimir Putin with justification for using maskirovka as a foreign policy tool in the 
2000s: if the West can interfere in Russian internal affairs, then Russia can do the same to the 
West.51 
Another instance of political maskirovka shows how Russia's government-backed media 
outlets capitalize on Western failures through a tu quoque logical fallacy: if there are problems in 
the West related to a certain economic or social sector, then the problems within Russia on the 
same issue are of no concern.52 This misdirection—or deception—of the Russian people 
provides internal support to Russian foreign policy by focusing the population's attention 
outward. While a lack of public support may not affect the course of Russian foreign policy, the 
visual of Russian citizens supporting the government is itself a tool that can be used in 
maskirovka. The Gerasimov Doctrine “economizes the use of force,” using any tool or capability 
in its arsenal to keep an adversary off-balance.53 In the early years of the Cold War, Francis 
Parker Yockey believed Soviet Russia would use "any inner agitation within the West... class-
war, race-war, social degeneration, crazy art, decadent films, wild theories and philosophies of 
all kinds” to dismantle the West.54 
Andrew Wilson, a British scholar, believes Russia went too far in Ukraine, and was not 
prepared to handle the shift from nonlethal information operations—a major part of hybrid 
warfare—to an open war.55 In the Gerasimov Doctrine, war is an acceptable and expected part of 
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the flow of conflict development, but only in localized, quick bursts of violent action. After all, 
the Gerasimov Doctrine seeks to use nonmilitary measures to avoid an escalation to full-scale 
war.56  
What we see from the Western perspective are Russian actions that, when viewed 
together, seem entirely antagonistic, belligerent, and inconsiderate of external consequences. The 
Russian Federation's foreign policy is unified under the direction of one man, Putin, so that 
Russia can “withstand internal and external challenges.”57 Viewing Russian foreign policy from 
the Western perspective has led to mirror imaging. The West believes Russia is unjustifiably 
escalating tensions through increased interference. This is based on a Western understanding of 
diplomacy as a foreign policy peacekeeping tool and not as a soft power tool to instigate conflict. 
Coincidentally, the Russian Federation's view of Western foreign policies is likewise 
mirror imaged. It creates a perception of aggression on both sides that fuels reciprocal aggressive 
reactions. Aggression here is defined by each side's interpretation of escalation of force. Where 
the West views sanctions as appropriate nonlethal diplomatic peacekeeping measures, Russia 
views sanctions as a “targeted military threat” which leads to a “crisis reaction.”58 From the 
Russian perspective—per the Gerasimov Doctrine—sanctions are equivalent to a “strategic 
deployment” of military forces, tantamount to a final warning shot before engaging in a direct 
military conflict.59 In each of the case studies below, this paper will show how this confusion 
created environments conducive to Russian foreign policy goals. 
 
56 Gerasimov, 28. 
57 Quote of Vladimir Putin's 2013 Valdai speech, as discussed by Anton Shekhovtsov, Russia and the 
Western Far Right (New York: Routledge, 2018), 81. 





The difference between what qualifies as an offensive or defensive action is also subject 
to Russia's own information operations, whose appropriate Russian terminology is information 
confrontation. Two years before the Russian annexation of Crimea, Putin stressed the importance 
of unity across “Greater Russia,” with the implication that Russia, as an idea that must be 
defended by the Russian Federation, is multifaceted and extends beyond official Russian 
borders.60 The “Russian Idea” is a nationalist concept from which Russians derive their sense of 
identity: through shared culture, religion, language, traditions, norms, and mores. Putin is the 
manifestation of the modern Russian Idea, similar to how historic figures like Peter the Great, 
Ivan the Terrible, Vladimir Lenin, and Josef Stalin were the embodiments of the Russian Idea 
during their respective times. As Russia annexed Crimea, Putin again argued that he was merely 
defending the Russian Idea.61 Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expanded on this 
defensive concept, stating “we have responded and will respond to any hostile actions against 
Russia and our citizens in a way we deem the most optimal for ourselves.”62  
These statements from Russia's most senior officials—Putin, Lavrov, and Gerasimov—
form the core of the Russian perspective on foreign policy actions. At its center, Russian foreign 
policy is a tool to defend the traditional Russian Idea, in all its forms, using any means necessary. 
This differs from Western foreign policy that is limited by international standards and the rule of 
law. The Gerasimov Doctrine plays to Russia's decades-old strengths in combatting threats 
through asymmetrical means on an unbalanced battlefield it has created. “No matter what forces 
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the enemy has,” Gerasimov wrote, “no matter how well-developed his forces and means of 
armed conflict may be, forms and methods for overcoming them can be found. He will always 
have vulnerabilities, and that means that adequate means of opposing him exist.”63 Deriving 
modern Russian foreign policy from Soviet maskirovka enables Russia to compete on the world 
stage at its own pace, in locations of its own choosing, using nonmilitary means. There are many 
terms used to describe this concept and its parts: active measures, denial and deception, grey-area 
warfare, information operations, hybrid war, mis- and disinformation campaigns, to name a few. 
The common theme among them involves the use of nonmilitary assets and avenues to degrade 
or deter adversarial capabilities.  
The Gerasimov Doctrine is a sliding scale of warfare that can escalate from covert 
influence operations to lethal action in an instant. It is adaptable and persistent. This differs from 
the U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine because the U.S. doctrine limits its operational scope to 
combatting insurgents in a sovereign state. It does not aim to impose the U.S.’s will on the state 
itself, it seeks to restore the rule of law in a sovereign state.64 However, it is possible to modify 
U.S. doctrine to fit state-on-state conflict. In acting out Russian foreign policy, the intended level 
of action—and the rate of change between levels—is carefully weighed against the ability of the 
target country to react decisively against Russian interests. From the Russian perspective, 
diplomacy is a step on the road to limited military conflict, it is not a tool used to avoid military 
conflict. With the Gerasimov Doctrine, Russia “create[s] a permanently operating front through 
the entire territory of the enemy states, as well as informational actions, devices, and means that 
are constantly being perfected.”65  
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Each case study below consists of three parts: a discussion of Russian actions directed at 
the target country, an evaluation of the target country’s counter-actions, and application of the 
Gerasimov Doctrine’s spectrum of conflict to determine efficacy of Russian actions. In this way, 
actions can be measured to verify or disprove this paper’s hypothesis. To be specific, this paper 
asserts that there is an interactive relationship between the level of Russian interference and the 
ability of the target country to retaliate against Russia across the spectrum of conflict as defined 
by the Gerasimov Doctrine. 
3.4  The United States 
 
 Russian foreign policy goals concerning the U.S. are often put in Western context by 
English-speaking media, thus masking its purpose and end state. In an interview, former U.S. 
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated: 
Their [Russia’s] first objective in the election was to sow discontent, discord and 
disruption in our political life, and they have succeeded to a fare-thee-well. They have 
accelerated, amplified the polarization and the divisiveness in this country, and they’ve 
undermined our democratic system. They wanted to create doubt in the minds of the public 
about our government and about our system, and they succeeded to a fare-thee-well.66 
 Accounts of Russian “trolls” tend to agree with this mission statement.67 However, they 
do not address the motives behind the actions. What advantages does Russia derive from a 
divisive U.S.? How does the Gerasimov Doctrine play a part in affecting the U.S., and did it 
further Russian foreign policy goals? Where does Russian foreign policy draw the line between 
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information warfare and kinetic warfare? Why did Russia use routes outside standard diplomatic 
channels to advance their foreign policy with the U.S.?  
3.4.1 Russian Actions 
 
Extensive cataloguing of Russian social media use for maskirovka (in this political 
context, disinformation and misinformation) campaigns leading up to the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election provides a foundation for understanding how Russia interfered with internal U.S. affairs. 
Troll factories published thousands of intentionally erroneous and inflammatory social media 
posts, and in many cases creating entirely false news targeted at locales, groups, or topics with 
methodical precision.68 These Russian efforts served as conduits not to create new discontent 
within the U.S., but to magnify existing social tensions in a way that would force Americans to 
question the authenticity of all information.69 This “heightening [of] the contradictions” in the 
U.S. is an anti-capitalist strategy attributed to Karl Marx and a central theme to the Marxist 
dialectic: through contradiction, a society engages in conflict with the end result of a new state of 
being (in Marx’s case, it was the internal contradictions of capitalist materialism that stoked 
conflict to create socialist thought).70.71 Coincidentally, Marx’s theories still play a role in the 
ideological battle between East and West. Russia’s commitment to maskirovka—and application 
of the Marxist dialectic—is evident in the slogan of state-sponsored Russian international media 
outlet RT, formerly Russia Today: “Question More.” 
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 Alongside the social media campaigns, Russia conducted cyber-attacks on U.S. energy 
infrastructure, according to both the U.S. Intelligence Community and cybersecurity firms.72 
Based on these reports, the attacks on U.S. energy infrastructure were not destructive in nature; 
they were intended to probe networks and retrieve information. The lack of energy disruption or 
destruction is significant here because it shows these efforts are the initial steps of intelligence 
gathering before shaping a battlespace, and not measures of conflict escalation. In other cyber 
activity, the U.S. Intelligence Community was prepared to pay for a return of U.S. spy tools from 
a Russian, only to cancel the deal “because they were wary of being entangled in a Russian 
operation to create discord inside the American government.”73 
 A third sphere of the Gerasimov Doctrine resides in Russian military action to support the 
Syrian regime, starting in 2015. Russia’s relationship with Syria dates back to the Soviet era, but 
Russia’s recent direct military support appeared to the West as a response to the U.S. military’s 
counterterrorism activity in Syria and to force the U.S. “into coalition with Assad.”74 However, 
Putin’s Press Secretary—Dmitry Peskov—stated in September, 2015, that Russia would only 
intervene at the request of the Syrian government.75 In the following years, Russia would 
conduct extensive military operations in Syria to validate military doctrine and showcase military 
equipment for arms sales—ranging from an aircraft carrier to ballistic missiles. Russia provided 
the military power necessary to combat both Islamic extremist groups and U.S.-backed Syrian 
 
72 Andy Greenberg, “Your Guide to Russia's Infrastructure Hacking Teams,” Wired, July 12, 
2017. https://www.wired.com/story/russian-hacking-teams-infrastructure/ (accessed September 8, 2017). 
73 Matthew Rosenberg, “U.S. Spies, Seeking to Retrieve Cyberweapons, Paid Russian Peddling Trump 
Secrets,” New York Times, February 9, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/us/politics/us-cyberweapons-
russia-trump.html (accessed February 9, 2018). 
74 David Petraeus, interviewed by Senate Armed Services Committee, September 22, 2015. https://www.c-
span.org/video/?328261-1/cia-director-david-petraeus-testimony-us-middle-east-policy&start=840 (accessed 
February 9, 2018). 
75 ITAR-TASS, “Минобороны РФ опровергло публикации об отправке контрактников в Сирию (The 
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation Has Refuted Publications on Sending Contract Soldiers to Syria),” 




opposition groups while occasionally using state media to infer U.S. support of Islamic 
extremists.76 
 These three spheres—social, information, and military—comprise the majority of 
Russian interference on U.S. activity. Each of the events above resulted in a response from the 
U.S., usually in the form of diplomatic tools such as press releases, official warnings, direct 
attribution of activity to the Russian government, and sanctions. For the U.S., these responses 
constitute an escalation of force in diplomacy as a path away from war. 
3.4.2  U.S. Responses 
 
 Prior to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, multiple official inquiries began to 
investigate Russian influence in swaying American popular opinion. Both legislative chambers 
created lengthy reports, alongside a continuing FBI investigation, into possible collusion 
between the U.S. President and Russia. The findings of those reports detail much and more of 
what is listed in the preceding section and arrive at the conclusion of definite Russian 
interference in U.S. affairs. Interestingly, the FBI would not allow its investigation’s officials to 
be questioned by the Senate Judiciary Committee, implying a lack of trust in the Senate’s 
confidentiality.77 As a result of the reports, Congress passed multiple iterations of sanctions 
against specific Russian elites, closed Russian consulates, and expelled a number of Russian 
diplomats.78 The phrase “fake news” became a new buzzword to describe any questionable—and 
sometimes just unfavorable—news, social media postings, or other commentary. The 
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divisiveness in the media, a rejection of anti-Russian legislative recommendations by the U.S. 
President, lack of faith between federal institutions, all indicate Russian interference succeeded 
in the social sphere.  
 The U.S. cybersecurity failures went relatively unnoticed in major U.S. media outlets 
until the recent revelations of Cambridge Analytica’s involvement with both Russian entities and 
Facebook, which resulted in requests for criminal investigation of Cambridge Analytica for 
foreign influence on U.S. elections.79.80 By April of 2018, Facebook had lost $66 billion in 
market capitalization, was sued in a class-action lawsuit, and thousands of users deleted their 
Facebook accounts.81.82 In 2017, Facebook was the sixth largest company in the world—ranked 
by market value—valued at $407.3 billion U.S. dollars.83 The ability to create a massive negative 
impact on a large scale showcases the effectiveness of these campaigns when they are 
uncovered. Maintaining cover for Russian actions is critical to Russian foreign policy success, 
and its failure resulted in significant embarrassment for the Russian military via its private 
military contractors. 
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 Russia’s military actions in Syria have accomplished their stated objective and kept 
President Assad in power. Islamic extremist groups are remnants of their former power, yet the 
Syrian opposition groups continue to fight the Syrian government. In the only significant contact 
between Russian and U.S. forces in Syria, somewhere between 60 and 200 Russians were killed 
as they attempted to assault a U.S. compound.84 The incident’s cause is still unknown, but the 
results are clear: Russia was not capable of confronting U.S. forces directly. When U.S. forces 
engaged the Russians, Russia could not, or would not, provide immediate fire support to their 
engaged forces. This lack of commitment implies doubts in Russian military leadership directed 
at either their ability to confront the U.S. military, or at their faith in the Russian doctrine. In 
addressing Russian military actions abroad, U.S. Senator Ben Cardin said “the numbers [of 
legislators] were overwhelmingly in support of taking a tough stand against Russia. If Russia’s 
conduct continues… I think Congress will remain united in demanding that action be taken 
against Russia.”85 
3.4.3  Effectiveness of the Gerasimov Doctrine 
 
 Russian foreign policy regarding the U.S. and viewed through the lens of the Gerasimov 
Doctrine answers the questions posed at the beginning of this case study. A divided U.S. is 
beneficial to Russia because it creates distrust in the democratic establishment, forces the U.S. to 
react to Russian actions, and restricts preemptive capabilities. By enflaming social tensions in the 
U.S., Russia can use its standard tu quoque attacks to deflect any internal pressure. Whatever 
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social problems exist in Russia are surely problems in the West, and therefore not worth 
worrying about. If this is the case, then it is possible—and logical—that Russian foreign policy is 
a mechanism to strengthen its domestic policy in an attempt to maintain power. 
 The most significant weaknesses in Russia’s approach to the U.S. appear when Russian 
actions are brought out of the darkness. Fact-based, direct attribution with tangible evidence can 
force Russia to admit—at least in some small part—its actions. To wit, Russian ground troops 
operating in Syria on the front lines have long been denied by the Russian government. 
However, when U.S. forces killed the assaulting forces on a U.S. outpost in Syria and proved 
their Russian origin, Russia was forced to admit there were Russians on the front lines. Even 
though Russia officially labeled them private military contractors—as in Ukraine—the admission 
in and of itself is a significant failure for the Russian government. 
 Therefore, as it relates to the U.S., Russia is most effective at sowing social distrust 
through mediums that make attribution difficult—actions found on the low end of the Gerasimov 
Doctrine. Russia succeeded in widening the chasm of political discourse but was more prone to 
failure the higher Russian actions rose on the scale of conflict in the Gerasimov Doctrine. 
Ironically, Putin’s approval ratings among U.S. citizens increased by 9% from 2015 to 2017, 
largely due to a 20% and 11% uptick among Republicans and Independents, respectively 
(Democrat’s opinions of Putin dropped 5% during the same period).86  
To extrapolate on this, a 2018 Gallup poll puts worldwide approval of U.S. leadership at 
an all-time low—30%—and also states that for the first time ever, more people worldwide 
 
86 Art Swift, “Putin's Image Rises in U.S., Mostly Among Republicans,” Gallup, February 21, 





disapprove of U.S. leadership than approve.87 There are certainly other variables affecting this 
rating, yet the empirical data stands: Russia’s ability to affect narratives in international media 
and within the U.S. should not be underestimated. Russian efforts may also have contributed to 
the declining international view of U.S. leadership. Harming the perception of U.S. leadership 
has global implications if the U.S. wants to remain the world power.  
If Russian interference in domestic U.S. affairs can alter the outcome of a U.S. foreign 
policy goal, then more research is required to evaluate the degree to which it is altered. For the 
purposes of this paper, Russian interference maintains an interactive relationship with the U.S. 
Through the lens of the Gerasimov Doctrine, the closer Russian foreign policy gets to direct 
military action with the U.S., the less likely its foreign policy will be advantageous for Russian 
goals. Because diplomacy correlates to low-level military action in the Gerasimov Doctrine, it is 
not a useful tool for Russia to implement its foreign policy with the U.S. To that end, maskirovka 
remains the most effective tool to accomplish Russian foreign policy initiatives toward the U.S. 
3.5  The United Kingdom 
 
 Russian behavior is more aggressive toward the U.K. than toward the U.S. All three 
countries are nuclear powers, but the U.K.’s ability to affect Russia has diminished over the last 
century, especially after the European Union Referendum—colloquially referred to as the E.U. 
Referendum or “Brexit”—on July 24, 2016. Specifically, the U.K.’s influence in the E.U. is 
significantly reduced. The U.K. created a variety of gaps in economic and defense ties to both 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and E.U. countries and has become more 
susceptible to Russian interference as internal U.K. debate concerning its international position 
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increases. Russian kinetic activities within the U.K. are also significantly more aggressive than in 
the U.S.: since 2003, there has been a consistent string of Russian-attributed assassinations in 
U.K. territory.88 The U.K.’s Shadow Home Secretary—Andy Burnham—warned of a tepid 
British response to these assassinations: 
The Home Secretary [Theresa May] indicated that there will be new diplomatic pressure, 
and I welcome that, but I have to say, having listened carefully to her, that I am not sure 
that it goes anywhere near far enough in answering the seriousness of the findings in this 
report. Indeed, it could send a dangerous signal to Russia that our response is too weak. 
What has been announced today cannot be the end of what the British Government are 
prepared to do.89 
 Russian foreign policy toward the U.K. is a middle ground between its covert approach to 
the U.S., and its nearly overt application in Ukraine. The U.K.—like the U.S.—attempts to 
maintain a democratic international peace and use diplomatic means to avoid any possibility of 
escalation into overt war. The problem lies in the U.K. (and U.S.’s) misidentification of Russian 
behavior via mirror imaging. The Western governments apply Western rationale to Russian 
actions instead of viewing those actions with a Russian perspective, namely the Gerasimov 
Doctrine. 
 These misunderstandings obscure a clear view of Russian foreign policy toward the U.K., 
and pose the following questions: Why does Russia view the U.K. as a more permissive 
operating environment than the U.S.? What indicators exist that Russia will become more 
aggressive within the U.K.? Is there a different Russian approach to interfering in the U.K. vis a 
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vis the U.S., and if so, what is different? What is the same? Finally, what foreign policy goals 
does Russia achieve through its actions in the U.K.? 
3.5.1  Russian Actions 
 
 Like its behavior in the U.S., Russian actions can be separated into three spheres: social, 
information, and military. In the social sphere, Russian actions focus on existing tensions. The 
primary tension in recent history pertains to U.K. sovereignty and its role in the European Union. 
Within the information environment, Russia capitalizes on spreading misinformation through 
social media and the Russian state-sponsored news outlets of RT and Sputnik, in addition to 
disruptive cyberattacks. The military aspect is relegated to covert operations predominantly 
focused on assassinations, and overt operations of airborne intelligence gathering and other 
provocative maneuvers.90 These actions represent an escalation of force when compared to 
Russian interference in the U.S. and can provide valuable insights into how Russia executes its 
foreign policy with respect to the target country’s ability to affect Russian interests. 
 The 2016 E.U. Referendum, referred to hereafter as Brexit, represented a culminating 
event of social tensions within the U.K. On the “vote leave” side, voters wanted a return to 
traditional values, an isolationist approach to foreign policy, and a removal of E.U. interference 
in U.K. political and economic policies. Conversely, the “vote remain” side embraced the E.U., 
desired a more progressive stance of integration with supranational entities, and believed E.U. 
integration to be essential in improving the U.K.’s ability to influence international politics and 
their own economy. Alongside the Scottish independence referendum, Brexit posed a significant 
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threat to the U.K.’s identity. Russia capitalized on the strong sentiments on both sides of the aisle 
through an intense social media campaign. 
 Similar to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Russian social media campaigns comprised 
of vast troll factories and botnets to influence the online social narrative. According to an in-
depth analysis of Twitter postings, there were at least 13,493 Russian-attributed bots that posted 
63,797 tweets relating to Brexit.91 For comparison, the same study also identified only 30,122 of 
the 794,949 twitter accounts tweeting about Brexit as located within the U.K.92 The narratives 
used in the botnet tweets promoted far-left (vote remain) and, to a larger degree, far-right (vote 
leave) messages in attempts to cause what Bastos and Mercea term “cascades”—or compounding 
amounts of retweets indicative of quickly spreading (mis)information.93  
A collaborative paper between students at Swansea University and University of 
California, Berkeley, corroborates the identification and narrative of these Russian botnets.94 
Interestingly, both studies conclude that the bots were able to affect human dialogue on Twitter 
while not interacting directly with human tweets, and those human cascades were quicker and 
more widely dispersed than the botnet’s.95 In conjunction with social media postings, Russian 
state-sponsored media promoted closer ties between the U.K. and Russia outside E.U. constructs 
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well before Brexit.96 After Brexit, Russian media used tu quoque arguments to imply Western 
elites manipulated the Brexit vote.97 
 For the U.K., Russian interference in the information sphere poses a significant national 
security threat. By using the aforementioned state-sponsored media to increase tensions, Russian 
efforts sought to influence the Scottish independence referendum.98 Had the referendum 
succeeded, the U.K. would be forced into complicated negotiations to retain its only nuclear 
submarine base, located at Faslane, Scotland. Regarding Russian cyber activity, the U.K.’s 
National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) attributed “60 cyber-attacks a month” to Russia, with 
the attacks focusing on national defense, “media, telecommunications, and energy sectors.”99.100 
Russia’s combination of the information output of state-sponsored media with directed cyber-
attacks constrains the U.K.’s ability to manage threats and mitigate attacks: the U.K. cannot 
effectively diffuse the effects of Russian efforts without impeding basic democratic freedoms of 
speech and press. 
Russia also takes advantage of campaign funding loopholes in the U.K. to provide 
financing through European companies to U.K. politicians and organizations aligned with 
Russian goals.101 A key politician in these misinformation campaigns is Nigel Farage, head of 
the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), whose platform aligns with Russia’s anti-E.U. 
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stance. While Farage is likely not working for the Russian government, he serves as a “useful 
idiot” for Russia, a Soviet-era phrase to describe knowing or unknowing contributors to Russian 
narratives. The UKIP’s platform regarding the E.U. is a misinformation gold mine for Russian 
efforts to increase tensions among voters.102 Furthermore, Russian state-sponsored media 
coverage of terrorist attacks in the U.K. stokes xenophobic sentiment and provides a plausible 
alternative source of Russian-directed assassinations. 
Assassinations on U.K. territory are Russia’s most provocative foreign policy tool in the 
U.K.—and the most dangerous for Russia. Since 2006, there have been 15 successful 
assassinations within the U.K. attributed to the Russian government.103 Assassinations serve two 
purposes: they are reminders to other countries that Russian foreign policy trumps international 
standards, and as a warning to would-be leakers, whistleblowers, and spies that the Russian 
government recognizes no safe haven for defectors. To legitimize their efforts, Russian law 
amended and expanded the definition of “extremist” to include any party or actor that speaks 
against the Russian government.104 Because extremist behavior is a federal crime, it falls under 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the Russian equivalent of the FBI and 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) combined with additional international authorities. 
Inquiries into these assassinations have attributed the killings to the FSB.105  
 Each of these examples show an increased acceptability of risk on Russia’s behalf. Their 
foreign policy approach to the U.K. is aggressive and disregards international standards of state 
sovereignty. Even though Russian behavior continues to test the limits of the U.K.’s stance on 
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acceptable foreign policy, the U.K. has remained relatively passive in its responses despite a 
robust military and intelligence structure. 
3.5.2  U.K. Responses 
 
 Like the U.S., the U.K.’s responses to Russian interference are purely diplomatic in 
nature. Social and information sphere misinformation campaigns are reactively prosecuted 
through inquiries, attribution to state actors, diplomatic expulsions, and sanctions.106 The U.K. 
also established the NCSC to boost pre-emptive defenses against cyber-attacks. In 2015—prior 
to Brexit—the E.U. also established the “E.U. vs Disinformation Campaign” to “address and 
respond to pro-Kremlin disinformation.”107  
Like the misinformation campaigns, military actions—including FSB-linked 
assassinations—are met with diplomatic responses. Both the U.S. and U.K. respond to Russian 
interference in accordance with international standards: through diplomacy. However, these 
responses are both a misunderstanding of Russian intent and a misrepresentation of Western 
behavior in the context of Russian foreign policy (via the Gerasimov Doctrine). Despite Russia 
showing it will not abide by international agreements, U.K. officials continue to operate under 
the belief that Russia will eventually fall in line.108  
 Following the most recent assassination attempt, the U.K. made the same predictable, 
standard response: expelling diplomats. While this measure is typical, it’s worth noting the 
number of diplomats expelled, 23, is “the biggest expulsion in 30 years,” in addition to future 
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absence of U.K. elites at Russian events and increased scrutiny of Russian travelers.109 
Regarding sanctions and other U.K. diplomatic measures, it seems that U.K. policymakers 
understand there is a defect in their approach:  
There is a question about how the Government go about formulating their response [to 
Russian-linked assassinations] and the considerations that will guide them. Although the 
Home Secretary [Theresa May] ordered this review, it is important to note that she 
originally refused to do so, citing international issues. She has mentioned them again today, 
but should not it be considerations of justice, not diplomacy, that lead the Government’s 
response? Will she give a categorical assurance to that effect? There can be no sense of the 
Government pulling their punches because of wider diplomatic considerations. If we were 
to do that, would it not send a terrible message to the world that Britain is prepared to 
tolerate outrageous acts of state violence on its soil and appease those who sanctioned 
them?110 
 
3.5.3  Effectiveness of the Gerasimov Doctrine 
 
 Russian interference in the U.K. is a step above Russian efforts in the U.S. Where there 
were cyber probing attempts in the U.S., there were disruptive attacks in the U.K. Where military 
efforts existed outside U.S. sovereign territory, Russia conducts assassinations within the U.K. 
Where Russia used trolls and bots in the U.S. to further divide groups, they effectively helped 
split the U.K. internally (through independence referendums) and externally (through Brexit). 
Furthermore, these efforts are more inter-related, and thus more effective, in the U.K. than the 
U.S. 
 Russian foreign policy views the U.K. as a testbed for pushing the limits of Western 
tolerance through the Gerasimov Doctrine. The U.K. has strong ties to the U.S. through the Five 
Eyes intelligence sharing program—and collaborative defense through supranational structures 
like NATO—yet these seem to have no effect on Russian foreign policy decisions outside 
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preventing Russian overt, kinetic military action. If these structures were effective, we should 
expect to see equal Russian interference in the U.S. and the U.K. We can therefore assume that 
Russia views the U.K. as a weaker partner within these structures, creating a more permissive 
operating environment for Russian maskirovka campaigns.  
 If we apply this logic to the Gerasimov Doctrine, we can draw out indications of future 
Russian actions. For instance, when the U.K. provides a lukewarm response (according to the 
Gerasimov escalation of force, not the Western perspective), we can expect Russia to increase its 
aggressiveness at the next opportunity. For Russia, the usefulness of the Gerasimov Doctrine lies 
both in denial of operations and its quick-shifting between escalation and de-escalation as a 
situation unfolds. Unlike the Russian foreign policy goals with the U.S.—to increase tensions as 
proof that the West has the same, if not more, problems as Russia, and is therefore irrelevant—its 
goals with the U.K. are more destructive. 
 The aggressiveness with which Russia applies its foreign policy tools toward the U.K. 
imply Russia desires more tangible results than it does with the U.S. Specifically, Russian 
foreign policy goals are related to the disruption of Western coherence through the E.U. Brexit 
removes the E.U.’s most direct tie to the U.S. and thus one of the E.U.’s strongest anti-Russian 
voices. This disruption accomplishes a multitude of objectives. With the U.K. removed from the 
E.U., it reduces “the likelihood that a unified West would enforce sanctions against Russia.”111 
The U.K.’s absence also serves as a warning to prospective E.U. countries like Ukraine and 
Turkey that Russian state-sponsored media exploits: The E.U. is not as stable or as desirable as 
the West makes it seem, even its strongest member is leaving.  
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For the U.K., Russian foreign policy via the Gerasimov Doctrine has proven effective 
across covert misinformation campaigns and covert assassinations. The U.K. is more susceptible 
than the U.S. to intense escalations, and continued lukewarm diplomatic responses only confirm 
to Russia that the U.K. is unwilling to confront Russia directly. A combination of Russian 
misinformation and covert military actions is the most effective method for Russian foreign 
policy toward the U.K. This leaves the U.K. with few options that do not escalate into war, and 
U.K. responses to Russian interference have, to date, been ineffective in preventing future 
Russian operations. 
3.6  Ukraine 
 
 Russian interference in Ukraine is by far the most overt, aggressive, and deadly of these 
three case studies. Following the Orange Revolution in 2004, Russia recognized a threat to its 
security: a possible Western-leaning country sharing a border with Russia. It was not seen as just 
a military threat, but an economic and ideological threat. Economically, Ukraine was poised to 
apply to the E.U., and with that reap the benefits of reduced trade restrictions, proper anti-
corruption guidance and supervision, as well as a variety of ethical measures. Ideologically, 
Russia’s “little Russians”—a diminutive familial Russian term for Ukrainians—adopting a 
Western way of life threatened Russia’s sphere of influence that includes the former Soviet Bloc. 
This threat is perhaps the most significant because of the similarities of Ukrainian and Russian 
cultures: If it could happen to Ukraine, then Russia itself was at risk.112 
 To combat these perceived Western aggressions, Russia implemented its own union, the 
Eurasian Economic Union (E.E.U.), consisting mostly of former Soviet countries. Its 
 




predecessor, the Eurasian Economic Community, included Ukraine as a founding member, but 
Ukraine then refused to join the E.E.U. and instead favored the European Union.113 For the 
Russian government, Ukraine is considered a part of Greater Russia, giving Russia the right to 
defend Russians abroad by any means necessary. 114 This logic remains the current Russian 
defense for its interference in Ukraine. Likewise, many Westerners still refer to Ukraine as “the 
Ukraine,” which infers it is a region under the control of a state (in this case it was USSR), 
similar to “the Donbass” being a region within the Ukrainian state. 
 Unlike the U.S. and U.K., Ukraine lacks any robust offensive structures—it cannot 
retaliate against Russia to a large enough degree that would alter Russian foreign policy. Ukraine 
surrendered its nuclear arsenal following the collapse of the Soviet Union and has failed to 
become a member of major supranational organizations. Its responses to Russian interference are 
predominately physical due to a lack of relative diplomatic or economic strength in relation to 
Russia. Ukraine has a centuries-old history of conflict both with the West and Russia, which has 
left it as an isolated cross-civilizational melting pot for violence.  
 The questions this case study seeks to answer are directed at the full use of the Gerasimov 
Doctrine in Russian foreign policy: How effective is the Gerasimov Doctrine when applied to a 
non-peer adversary? What are the indicators that Russia will use the full extent of the Gerasimov 
Doctrine toward a country? What are the Russian foreign policy goals with Ukraine, and how 
does the Gerasimov Doctrine help reach those goals? Why does Russian foreign policy toward 
Ukraine differ significantly from the other case studies? According to this paper’s hypothesis, 
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Russian foreign policy will be most aggressive in Ukraine—in comparison with the U.S. and 
U.K.—because Ukraine lacks the ability to retaliate against Russian interference to any 
significant degree. 
3.6.1  Russian Actions 
 
Russian interference in Ukraine involves maskirovka campaigns, lethal support to 
separatists, destructive cyber-attacks, and annexation of sovereign territory. Over the last four 
years, Russian interference in Ukraine has been at the forefront of international media and 
subject to innumerable academic studies. A brief list of relevant Russian foreign policy tools 
follows below. These actions constitute the most significant, and aggressive, form of Russian 
foreign policy in the post-Soviet era: 
• Russian state-sponsored media had a positive effect on pro-Russian political sentiment in 
Ukraine.115  
• Maskirovka campaigns discredited Western media and created doubt concerning official 
Western narratives within Ukraine.116  
• Russian cyber-attacks disrupted Ukrainian energy grids and on other occasions caused 
significant financial losses to international businesses.117.118 
• Covert Russian lethal support is directly responsible for the downing of Malaysian 
Airlines Flight 17.119  
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Dividing these events into the three spheres analyzed in the previous case studies—
social, information, and military—will aid in evaluating this paper’s overall hypothesis. Within 
the social sphere, Russian efforts in Ukraine tend to be more effective than in the U.S. or U.K. 
Russians and Ukrainians share a common civilizational history, simplifying a translation of 
thoughts and ideas. This shared history also created “local corruption and patronage networks” 
that “have become dangerous conduits of political and economic influence.”121 It is through this 
shared connection that Russian messaging improved pro-Russian sentiment among Ukrainians 
with pre-existing, pro-Russian beliefs.122 Russia’s understanding of this connection allowed their 
state-sponsored media to target demographically-Russian areas of Ukraine—the Northeast 
regions—to stir up anti-Western rhetoric and further Russian foreign policy goals through a 
Ukrainian civil war. 
Concerning related efforts within the information sphere, social media trolls amplified 
disinformation campaigns, spreading inflammatory messages targeting all sides of the Ukrainian 
conflict.123 Like the U.S. and U.K. instances, trolls and botnets worked together to spread 
disinformation. In the cyber realm, Russian interference increased in severity from data 
extraction to destruction and disruption. These cyber-attacks were more detailed than ones 
experienced in the West. The attackers took control of Ukraine’s energy grid, shutting off power 
in the middle of winter to over 225,000 Ukrainians.124 This was the first known cyber-attack in 
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the world to disrupt a country’s energy grid. In separate Russian-attributed cyber-attacks, various 
European corporations with Ukrainian ties had their data stolen and held for ransom, “costing 
hundreds of millions of pounds” in production delays and repairs.125 
The militarization of information is a key aspect of the Gerasimov Doctrine.126 Open 
conflict in Ukraine allowed Russia to experiment with various insurgency-support tactics that it 
has learned through previous wars in Afghanistan, Georgia, South Ossetia, and Chechnya. In 
order to maintain plausible deniability and prevent open confrontation with the West, it was 
imperative for Russia to funnel support through Russian “volunteers,” referred to during the 
Crimean annexation as “little green men.”127 However thin the cover may seem, the international 
community decided it was sufficient to prevent a direct military response from the West, and to 
date no foreign military has directly intervened on Ukraine’s behalf. 
3.6.2  Ukrainian Responses 
 
 Ukraine lacks the capability to form effective responses to Russian interference. Russia 
dominates the social, information, and military spheres through overwhelming power. Ukraine’s 
only course of action has been to appeal to other countries or supranational organizations to 
respond on Ukraine’s behalf. At its most extreme—Russia’s annexation of Crimea—the only 
responses were international sanctions and condemnation of the action. When Ukraine then 
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threatened to turn off power to Crimea, cyber-attacks shut down large swaths of the Western 
Ukrainian power grid.128 
 Russian military interference in Eastern Ukraine forced a protracted civil war, one that 
Ukraine does not seem capable of progressing past a stalemate. This, in turn, creates a significant 
financial and human drain on Ukraine, as it is forced to fight the separatists or risk additional 
gains by Russia and its proxy combatants. Although Ukraine is not a member of NATO, Russian 
interference in Ukraine added new training doctrines to NATO’s capabilities. Based on lessons 
learned from the Crimean annexation, NATO created a new exercise—Noble Jump—comprising 
“2,100 troops in a simulated… response to ‘unattibutable [sic] infiltration… [of] an ally by 
irregular or special forces’.”129 
3.6.3  Effectiveness of the Gerasimov Doctrine 
 
 Ukraine is the most extreme, current case to study Russian foreign policy. Russia is only 
constrained from executing a full scale kinetic war because direct, open war would likely result 
in an equal response from the West. Open war crosses the threshold between diplomacy and 
military force in the Western perspective of foreign policy. However, open war is likely not its 
ultimate foreign policy goal. For Ukraine, Russian foreign policy intends on maintaining a 
constant state of unattributable kinetic conflict, as it benefits Russia in a variety of ways. First 
and foremost, it provides a domestic narrative in Russia that Western powers are corrupt and 
seek to destabilize Russia. This falls in line with Putin’s “Fortress Russia” narrative: that Russia 
is under economic and ideological attack from the West, and Russia must defend itself 
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accordingly.130 By combining this narrative with Putin’s commitment to defending Russians 
abroad, Russia is thus legitimized in its information warfare and covert support in Ukraine.  
Second, keeping Ukraine in a state of war prevents it from applying to the E.U. and 
NATO, another blow to perceived Western expansionism in the eyes of Russia. Third, Russian 
interference in Ukraine serves as a warning to other former Soviet-bloc countries that may be 
looking to adopt Western standards. Finally, Russian foreign policy in Ukraine allows Russia to 
test the effectiveness of the Gerasimov Doctrine—combining military and nonmilitary actions on 
a shared scale of conflict—with little fear of physical reprisals: reprimands, diplomatic 
expulsions, and sanctions are both known and predictable entities. 
In a permissive environment such as Ukraine, the Gerasimov Doctrine’s perspective 
provides measurable benefits to Russian foreign policy goals. Misinformation and propaganda 
campaigns have demonstrated a positive effect on Russian sympathizers in Ukraine while 
stoking tensions among anti-Russian groups in the same area.131 Cyber-attacks created a first-
ever energy grid disruption as a hybrid soft and hard power tool to influence Ukrainian actions. 
Lethal support to separatists, combined with massive maskirovka campaigns, allowed freedom of 
movement and operation, increasing separatist’s effectiveness of combat operations and pro-
Russian messaging. The annexation of Crimea confirmed to Russia that viewing foreign policy 
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3.7  Evaluation 
 
 Each of the above case studies provide sufficient examples of Russian actions and target 
country reactions. A problem exists in the West: Western interpretations of both Russian actions 
and Western responses are evaluated with a Western understanding of escalation of force. 
Namely, diplomatic responses are viewed as separate from military responses. However, this 
does not provide ample rationale for Russian perspectives because diplomacy and military 
actions are viewed as integral parts of a shared scale.  
3.7.1  Methodology 
 
To provide a better understanding of this dynamic, this paper has taken the examples of 
Russia’s foreign policy actions from each case study, separated by sphere of power (social, 
information, and military), and applied them to the Gerasimov Doctrine’s phases of conflict 
development in Figure 3 and Table 1. Likewise, Figure 4 and Table 2 depict the target country’s 
reactions, as evaluated through the Gerasimov Doctrine. The point values assigned to each 
sphere correlate to the level of conflict listed in the doctrine. For example, the U.S.’s military 
response to the Russian assault on a U.S.-flagged base in Syria receives a point value of “4,” as it 
falls under the Gerasimov Doctrine’s “Military Measures: Conduct of Military Operations.”132 
Conversely, Ukraine’s lack of response to Russian interference in the social sphere receives a 
point value of “1.” Half values are assigned in situations where the response includes elements of 
two separate point values. 
Following the point value assignment, the mean value of each country’s sphere scores is 
plotted over the chart. This mean value is the overall value of the actions in the context of the 
 




Gerasimov Doctrine. The mean value assists in validating the hypothesis: there is an interactive 
relationship between the level of Russian interference and the ability of the target country to 
retaliate against Russia across the spectrum of conflict as defined in the Gerasimov Doctrine.  
In Figure 3, higher mean values indicate the ability and willingness of Russia to use more 
aggressive foreign policy tools than in instances with lower mean values. A higher mean value in 
Figure 4 indicates the ability of the target country to retaliate against Russian interference within 
the respective spheres of power, indicating Russian interference will be at levels that are less 
likely to receive a military response from the target country. A lower mean value in Figure 4 
indicates a target country that is unable to respond to Russian interference, and thus more likely 
to experience aggressive Russian foreign policy actions. 
3.7.2  Analysis 
 
This is an exploratory evaluation that serves as a starting point from which researchers 
can conduct additional research. Testing the hypothesis in this manner provides essential, broad-






Figure 3: Russian Interference in Target Country According to the Gerasimov Doctrine 
 
 
Table 1: Russian Interference in Target Country According to the Gerasimov Doctrine 
 Social Information Military Mean 
United States 2.0 1.0      2.0133 1.7 
United Kingdom 2.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 
Ukraine 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
 
 Figure 3 depicts Russia’s escalation of force in its foreign policy, as applied to the U.S., 
U.K., and Ukraine. As expected, Russian efforts are least aggressive in the U.S., and most 
aggressive in Ukraine. Further investigation—through an evaluation of a larger dataset of 
events—is warranted to confirm or refute these exploratory findings. 
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Figure 4: Effectiveness of Target Country Responses According to the Gerasimov Doctrine 
 
 
Table 2: Effectiveness of Target Country Responses According to the Gerasimov 
Doctrine 
 Social Information Military Mean 
United States 3.5 2.5      4.0134 3.3 
United Kingdom 3.5 2.5 2.5 2.8 
Ukraine 1.0 1.5 2.5 1.7 
 
 Figure 4 depicts the target country’s responses to Russian interference (shown in Figure 
3). There is an inverse relationship between Russian interference and the ability of a target 
country to retaliate. In this sampling, the potential for effective retaliation by the U.S. toward 
Russia limits the aggressiveness of Russian foreign policy tools, whereas Ukraine’s limited 
 
134 The U.S.’s military response to the Russian attack is retained for this dataset because it displays the 
willingness of the U.S. to counter direct Russian military action with American military action. While the event is 
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capabilities encourage extensive Russian aggression. The U.K.’s non-military response to 
Russian assassinations on U.K. territory further encourages aggressive Russian foreign policy. 
3.7.3  Implications 
 
 The Gerasimov Doctrine’s strengths lie in its ability to apply all forms of power onto a 
target country, removing the classical front lines of military conflict and engaging the entirety of 
a target country’s sovereignty. Social sphere influence is effective in expanding upon pre-
existing fears, prejudices, stereotypes, and tensions.135 This is especially evident in debates 
concerning democratic institutions, domestic integrity, and international sovereignty. Use of 
cyber-attacks as a foreign policy tool is a dangerous gray area between soft and hard power—
they are effective at intelligence gathering and have also shown to be capable of physical 
disruption of a target country’s infrastructure. Military coercion through covert support is most 
effective with an adjoining maskirovka campaign that increases difficulty of attribution back to 
Russia. 
 However, there are several weaknesses in the Gerasimov Doctrine’s perspective on 
international relations. Social media manipulation is not effective at creating new lines of 
tension, nor is it able to shift the larger conversation outside regional or localized events in 
Russia’s favor.136 Cyber-attacks in the information sphere are attributable to nation-states due to 
the complexity, motives, and amount of resources required. Military actions must remain covert 
or risk attribution and direct retaliation, as witnessed in Syria. That is not to say low-level state-
sponsored actions such as assassinations are ineffective—they are effective until the target 
 
135 William Brady et al., “Emotion Shapes the Diffusion of Moralized Content in Social Networks,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114, no. 28 (June): 7313-18, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1618923114 (accessed February 8, 2018). 




country escalates its response higher than Russia is willing to go. Similarly, counter-cyber 
offensives may result in a reduction of Russian cyber probing, but this doctrine is yet to be 
tested.137 
 This comparative case study does not analyze the intricacies of specific foreign policy 
events, and research at the individual level may not corroborate the findings of this paper. 
Additionally, this paper’s hypothesis would benefit from expanding the number of case studies to 
include non-Western countries in Africa, South America, the Middle East, and Asia. The 
relationship between Russia and China is of particular interest. Finally, a more thorough 
application of external variables into foreign policy decisions may help answer the “why” 
questions behind scenarios that do not fit the hypothesis. 
3.8  Conclusion 
 
 Russian interference in adversarial countries has a measured effect both on that country’s 
foreign policy, and on future Russian aggression. The Gerasimov Doctrine is a useful tool for 
evaluating both Russia’s, and its adversary’s, actions. It corrects a Western mirror imaging error 
in international relations while providing a measurable and definable reference in approaching 
Russian foreign policy. Prior to enacting a foreign policy tool, Russia uses the Gerasimov 
Doctrine to weigh its desired aggressiveness against the target country’s ability to retaliate. 
These two factors share an inverse relationship: The more likely a target country will retaliate 
against Russia, the lower Russian aggression in foreign policy will be. Conversely, a target 
country with few retaliation capabilities is more likely to receive more aggressive Russian 
actions in foreign policy. 
 
137 Cory Bennett, “John Bolton, Cyber Warrior,” POLITICO, April 1, 




 Russian foreign policy toward the U.S. is characterized by low-intensity actions across 
the social, information, and military spheres. This low-intensity is likely due to the U.S.’s robust 
abilities to retaliate across all spheres at all levels. However, the U.S. has shown itself to be 
unwilling to respond-in-kind or escalate non-physical Russian actions, and instead prefers using 
diplomatic foreign policy tools. There is potential for Russia to perceive these actions as 
conciliatory—based on its actions in the U.K. and Ukraine—and increase its aggressiveness in 
the U.S. Russia seeks to undermine democratic institutions in the U.S. as a signal to other 
countries—and domestically—that Western democracy is weak and susceptible to manipulation. 
 The U.K. takes a similar approach, preferring diplomatic courses of action. Russia is 
more aggressive toward the U.K. because the U.K. is less willing to escalate responses to 
Russian aggression. Brexit is a significant benefit to Russia—it provides inroads to a more 
favorable E.U. for Russia. The U.K. is also a safer environment than the U.S. for Russia to test 
its foreign policy tools against the West because the U.K. consistently refuses to use its national 
security relationships in its response to Russian aggression. The continuing trend of 
assassinations within the U.K. represents a substantial Russian foreign policy escalation when 
compared to its approach to the U.S. 
 Ukraine has the worst forecast of the three countries. It is unable to join supranational 
entities, and unwilling to bend to Russian aggression. Ukraine is stuck in perpetual violence that 
is quickly becoming a war of attrition with Russia. Russia is most aggressive in Ukraine because 
there is minimal possibility of Ukrainian—or international—military response. However, there is 
a clear line that Russia has not yet crossed: open military action against Ukraine. The standard 
diplomatic foreign policy tools the West uses as responses to Russian actions in Ukraine are 




 The most significant finding of this comparative case study is Russia’s ability to adapt to 
target country responses quickly and effectively. Russia has taken Soviet-era doctrines and 
shaped them into effective foreign policy tools through years of experimentation. The 
combination of maskirovka-like campaigns and military action is a new twist on centuries-old 
concepts of total war. The Gerasimov Doctrine takes the total war concept and applies it in 
limited fashion: striking only at the opportune moment. 
 This is also a boon to countries seeking to combat Russian interference. Understanding 
the Russian concept of the spectrum of warfare allows policymakers to forecast future Russian 
actions. While Russian foreign policy differs toward each country, the themes and methods of 
escalations remain the same. First, Russia will identify and manipulate sources of social tension 
to create discord and turn a country’s focus inward. Then, Russia can begin to probe defenses to 
look for weaknesses in social cohesion, civilian infrastructure, governmental procedure, and 
military capabilities. These are used to evaluate the target country’s response threat to Russia. 
Russia can then implement both soft and hard power tools, as described in the Gerasimov 
Doctrine, to achieve its foreign policy goals. 
 Countering this doctrine requires the full scope of national power and utilization of 
supranational organizations to overwhelm Russian capabilities or increase risk of retaliation to 
the extent that increased aggression is no longer viable for Russia. Education in critical thinking, 
open dialogue between intelligence communities and citizens, and a re-evaluation of diplomatic 
responses, are all possible solutions to Russian interference. Escalating diplomatic sanctions to a 
complete blockade may be the level at which Russia draws the line between non-kinetic and 




Whatever the solution, it is imperative to measure Russian actions—and our reactions—with the 










War by Other Means 
 
 
 This thesis framed Russian foreign policy within the so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine” 
construct. Doing so reduced potential for mirror imaging from the West by providing an alternate 
concept to understand how non-military levers of power can be used to effect regime change in 
sovereign states. This concept is further expanded to apply Gerasimov’s modified scale of 
conflict across a variety of engagements between the Russian Federation and the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Ukraine. While the Gerasimov Doctrine is not a “playbook” for Russian 
governmental behavior, it is a useful tool for researchers to begin experimenting with measuring 
the effectiveness of information confrontation campaigns. Before providing a way ahead, this 







 The first chapter found significant differences between the United States’ concept of a 
people’s right to self-determination and the Russian state’s version that is more akin to a state’s 
right to self-determination. In the United States, sovereignty comes from the people via their 
right of self-determination, which guarantees liberty, equality, and freedom of choice for all; the 
government exists to ensure and protect those rights. In the Russian Federation, sovereignty 
originates with the state and is used to ensure the state’s survival at the expense of individual 
liberties of its citizens. The Russian state, in its various forms, justifies this stance by 
emphasizing the need for unity across all of Russia’s disparate communities. Without unity of 
purpose, the government argues, these populations become susceptible to outside powers that 
threaten to destroy or alter their cultures and way of life. This unity of thought in Russian 
government is a centuries-old concept: Tsarist Russia used the state’s supremacy to force 
unification of all Russians under the Tsar, Soviet Russia forced unity of thought to ensure 
obedience to the state’s narrative, and the Russian Federation uses the concept of the “Russian 
Idea” to argue that the state must survive for Russian culture to survive. The Russian Idea is the 
current phrase enveloping a unified Russian identity, culture, ethics, and mores. 
 The genesis for each of the above arguments lies within the Russian state’s concept of 
sovereignty. Instead of the Russian people’s right to self-determination, the state provides a 
perception of choice while retaining power. That is not to say the Russian people are 
powerless—that is far from the truth. As history has shown, when the “Russian Idea” becomes 
disassociated from the state, revolution is not far behind. Therefore, maintaining congruence 
between the Russian Idea and the state is of the utmost importance: stability and security above 




 This belief is quite obviously at odds with the United States’ concept of sovereignty, 
which originates in a people’s right of self-determination. For the United States government, 
power comes from diversity of thought—which is dictated by the authority of the people through 
democratic institutions. No person and no entity is above the law in this construct, including the 
state. The notions of freedom of choice and government for the people, by the people, are sacred 
tenets to the understanding of sovereignty by the United States government. Stability in the 
United States is created not by unity of thought, but through compromise, where a difference of 
opinions is cherished and seen as a way to include all views in government. Security is likewise 
placed lower than individual freedoms because these freedoms have a higher intrinsic value for 
both the government and its citizens. For the United States, finding the proper balance between 
security and liberty is an ongoing debate. 
 Applying these differences in sovereignty to each state’s foreign policy prepares the 
Gerasimov Doctrine for evaluation. If the Russian Federation’s view of sovereignty relies on 
unity of thought to provide security and stability, then the Western democratic approach to 
sovereignty as an open discussion of differing opinions is an existential threat. Furthermore, 
because stability and security is held above all else for the Russian Federation, it is therefore 
justified in using all facets of national power.  
The key facet for this thesis is the modern-day interpretation of maskirovka, a Soviet-era 
phrase regarding military denial and deception activities. Maskirovka has evolved to include the 
information and social spheres, with activities ranging from cyber-attacks to mis- and dis-
information campaigns across all forms of media. Maskirovka is directly related to the 
Gerasimov Doctrine because it is these very activities General Valery Gerasimov believed the 




It is worth noting that the Gerasimov Doctrine may be a case of mirror imaging, where 
General Gerasimov projected Russian methods of covert action onto the West and combined 
them with historical regime change efforts by the United States. If Gerasimov himself fell victim 
to mirror imaging in describing these revolutions, it validates his speech as a Russian 
government perspective on using non-military means in conflict. Similarly, if Gerasimov spoke 
from his own interpretation of world events, his “doctrine” remains a valid method to understand 
geopolitical events because of his position as Chief of the General Staff—a rough equivalent to 
the United States’ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with added powers and responsibilities. 
The second chapter found that Russian nationalism is an effective conduit through which 
Russian intelligence agencies can conduct maskirovka campaigns in Ukraine. Building off the 
first chapter’s discussion on the Russian Federation’s concept of sovereignty, the second chapter 
investigated nationalism as a foreign policy tool. Nationalism consolidates Russian opinions 
under the umbrella of the Russian state’s views on domestic policy and international order. 
Russian nationalism sources its power from pre-existing grassroots nationalism—deep-seated 
beliefs among far-right-leaning Russians concerning oppression from external actors, defense of 
the Russian Idea, the role of Russia as protector of Christianity, and the need for a stable 
government. The Russian Federation uses these beliefs to project a defensively-postured 
nationalist rhetoric: the state is merely protecting all Russians, regardless of state sovereignty, 
because it is obligated to protect the Russian Idea. This is opposite the standard Western 
understanding of Russian nationalism, a view that claims the Russian Federation seeks to expand 
its territory in a return to historical boundaries calling back to tsarist and communist eras. 
If Russian nationalism is defensive in nature, the state can more easily create 




defensive posturing as a response to external threats. This is much more palatable on the 
international stage and at home. On the world stage, a defensive posture is less aggressive and 
therefore less threatening. At home, the defensive argument blends well with the Russian 
Federation’s concept of sovereignty and protecting the Russian Idea. 
Russian nationalism is a double-edged sword for President Putin. It benefits Putin in the 
short-term by shoring up sentiment that supports the state’s narratives concerning Western 
encroachment on the Russian way of life. There is potential, however, for this sentiment to 
continue to grow toward more extreme ends. Far-right ideologues like Aleksandr Dugin have 
been used by the state in the past to support the nationalist rhetoric. Should this far-right base 
grow, and its demands not be met by the Russian Federation, Putin risks alienating them and 
distancing himself from the Russian Idea he molded. In the past, separating the state’s leader 
from the Russian Idea has not ended for the leader or the state. 
Ukraine, one of the targets of Russian nationalist messaging against the West, is stuck in 
a geopolitical no-man’s-land. It cannot join the European Union nor the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization because of its ongoing conflict and border disputes. Ukraine also turned down the 
offer to join the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, leaving the United Nations as its only 
chance for recourse. If Ukraine wants to regain its territories, it is possible to leverage its shared 
past with Russia as a threat to the Russian Idea.  
Ukraine is a threat for the same reasons Russian nationalism is effective: the two share a 
significant and lengthy cultural history. If Western ideologies take hold in Ukraine and Ukraine 
prospers from it, there is a serious possibility that these may spread to ethnic Russian Ukrainians, 
and then into the Russian community as a whole. Gurr’s theory of relative deprivation explains 




at a slower rate, or declines, Russians would see an increasing disparity between themselves and 
the Ukrainians. Because the two cultures share a lengthy history, the transfer of Western ideas is 
much easier when funneled through Ukraine rather than going directly from the West into 
Russian culture. This culture play is not without significant risks: threatening the Russian Idea 
without a substantial defensive pact can result in more destructive Russian state actions against 
Ukraine. 
The third chapter explored why and how the Russian Federation behaves toward different 
levels of Western state adversaries. It used the construct of the Gerasimov Doctrine’s scale of 
conflict to evaluate state-on-state actions between the Russian Federation and three separate 
states: The United States, United Kingdom, and Ukraine. Ukraine is included as a Western 
adversary in this chapter because of the threat it poses as a conduit of Western ideals into Russia, 
as discussed in the second chapter. The third chapter found that Russian state actions across the 
three spheres evaluated (social, information, and media) are inversely proportional to the 
potential of the target state to retaliate and negatively affect the Russian Federation.  
Actions directed toward the United States have been exploratory and non-damaging. 
Examples include social media influence campaigns, intelligence gathering on critical U.S. 
infrastructure, and observation of military activities. Of the three Western countries evaluated, 
the United States poses the most significant threat to the Russian Federation. The United States 
promotes itself as the leader of the free world, a strong backer of democratic institutions, and as 
the single most powerful state on Earth. Whether or not these are true is irrelevant, it is the 
international audience’s perception of the United States that matters. Based on these perceptions, 
Russian state messaging can frame the United States as an oppressive international bully intent 




to the defensive nationalism argument and the Russian state’s concept of sovereignty: The 
Russian Federation is obligated to protect the Russian Idea from these threats. 
The United Kingdom is similar to the United States, but less threatening to the Russian 
Federation. It is therefore susceptible to more aggressive Russian state actions, such as 
assassinations, stronger efforts to influence voting campaigns, and more threatening military 
maneuvers. The relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom also has 
interesting corollaries to the Russian Federation’s relationship with Ukraine. Both groups have 
significant shared history, cultures, and ideologies. The United Kingdom is the United States’ 
strongest link to the European Union, just as Ukraine is the largest conduit for Western ideas into 
Russia. Both groups shared a “special relationship,” with Ukraine and the Russian Federation’s 
relationship ending with the Ukrainian refusal to join the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union. 
As such, it is logical for the Russian Federation to try and sever the ties between the United 
States and the European Union. Brexit was a perfect target of opportunity. 
Confronting the United States head on is too dangerous for the Russian Federation. By 
attacking its relationships via intermediaries, like the United Kingdom, it can mitigate that risk. 
Influencing the Brexit campaign for it to succeed would remove the United States’ strongest 
voice from the European Union, leaving the E.U. more susceptible to Russian foreign policy 
initiatives that would fill the power void. For the United Kingdom, there is little the state can do 
to affect the Russian Federation. 
Ukraine has the least realistic leverage against the Russian Federation. Outside the 
ideological threats previously mentioned, Ukraine is relegated to a proving ground for what the 
West would consider the more dubious side of Russia’s foreign policy tools. Across all three 




campaigns have been discussed at length in the chapter on Russian nationalism. Russian 
information-sphere activities created real-world impacts by shutting down western Ukrainian 
power plants with a cyber-attack, the first of its kind. This was likely in response to Ukraine 
threatening to cut off its power supply to Crimea post-annexation. Russian military activity in 
Ukraine is only obscured by the thinnest of veils: Russian weapons are responsible for the 
downing of Malaysian Airlines’ MH-17 over eastern Ukraine. The Russian Federation also 
provided direct military support in annexing Crimea and occupying Ukraine’s sovereign territory 
across eastern Ukraine. Due to its unique geographic and ideological position between the West 
and the Russian Federation, events in Ukraine merit much closer analysis.  
Impacts 
 
The conclusions drawn in this thesis have three distinct forms of impact. First, to the 
policymaking bodies of the states discussed. Second, to the intelligence agencies guided by their 
state’s respective policies, laws, and social norms. Third, to researchers and as a foundation for 
future study. The impacts of this thesis are wide ranging because information warfare, or 
information confrontation, can affect all facets of life. From altering perspectives on sovereignty, 
to driving nationalist campaigns, and ultimately to distorting the “ground-truth” on a battlefield, 
information warfare must be interpreted and understood within its proper context to reduce the 
potential for miscalculation. Using the framework of the Gerasimov Doctrine as an approach to 
understanding foreign policy, of which information warfare is a part, is a step toward reducing 
miscalculations with the Russian Federation. 
Creating and directing foreign policy is an incredibly complex challenge on its own. 
Overlaying the potential for biases and misunderstandings only makes it more difficult. This 




Federation. Policymakers in one state should make a point of understanding the origins of 
another state’s concept of sovereignty in relation to its own—they are likely to be quite different. 
Interpretation and execution of foreign policy are derived from this selfsame concept of 
sovereignty, and policymakers must understand the difficulties involved in avoiding mirror 
imaging. This thesis does not presume to support one form of government over another, it has 
found strengths and weaknesses in each that policymakers can use to form effective and 
beneficial policies in the future. Perhaps this approach is beneficial in itself: to accept that there 
may not be a “one size fits all” form of government, and that unnecessary competition or “one-
upmanship” is not always the answer. These are not new lessons gleaned from this thesis, but the 
findings within these pages help confirm the notions. 
A word of caution to policymakers regarding the power of information in the twenty-first 
century: Information is only as powerful as it is believed or perceived. Facts lose their power in 
social discourse when they are not understood, or worse, misunderstood. This is incredibly 
crucial in devising policy to combat misinformation and disinformation. As this thesis has 
shown, emotion—be it through personal experiences of a citizen or a state’s ideological 
rhetoric—is powerful enough to reject facts both at the individual and societal levels. Influence 
campaigns that use information should therefore be treated as dangerous weapons in the toolbox 
of national powers. Likewise, they must be used with extreme precision and caution, their effects 
are often wider ranging and more impactful than originally intended.  
If a state is targeted by such an influence campaign, serious debate must occur at the 
national and international levels on how to react. Current laws in most states and supranational 
organizations do not properly define nor address the significance of information warfare. Should 




difference between a cyber-attack that shuts down a power plant and a military special forces 
raid that takes control over that same plant? Is there a difference? In terms of effect on a 
sovereign state, this thesis argues there is no difference, and that the information realm should be 
treated with the same caution and apprehension as entering a hot war. Such a change in policy 
across the world will be long forthcoming, but the United States and Russia are prime forces for 
change in this sphere. Policymakers looking to make an impact in the information world need 
only look at the dearth of legislation and laws controlling state activities therein. 
Intelligence agencies have differing roles according to their respective state’s laws and 
norms. Nevertheless, the findings in this thesis are applicable to all. As the executor of policy in 
both military and non-military realms, intelligence agencies must hone their offense and defense 
to be pinpoint accurate. Within the construct of the Gerasimov Doctrine, both the military and 
non-military realms affect a shared scaled of conflict. Whether in the offense or defense against 
the Russian Federation, it is important to understand this context. Intelligence analysts must 
understand the full scope and implication of actions across both realms, and that one realm 
affects the other.  
Moreover, it is possible for intelligence actions in one realm to drive actions, 
intelligence-derived or not, in the other realm. For example, an intelligence agency conducting 
influence activities of a non-military nature may inadvertently create an equivalent or escalatory 
military response from the target state. In the same vein, a military intelligence action may drive 
a non-military response, such as an economic blockade or removal of diplomatic personnel from 
the state. These are not new concepts in the West, yet it is a new perspective by placing them on 




Intelligence collectors, especially those responsible for human intelligence, should be 
well-versed in the effects of various ideological “-isms” on their target population. Within the 
scope of this thesis, nationalism’s effects are of particular note. The rise of nationalist ideologies 
across the world in the beginning of the twenty-first century is a force that will affect the 
judgment and decision-making spaces from the smallest level of society to the largest 
policymaking bodies. Collectors must be cognizant of nationalism’s potential to distort a 
source’s perceived ground-truths beyond typical source bias. 
Leaders within the intelligence communities must keep their fingers on the heartbeat of 
the quickly evolving information sphere. They are responsible for adhering to updated laws and 
rules of war, and they must be held accountable as such within their respective forms of 
government. Intelligence community leaders must not only be aware of their state’s laws and 
norms, but of those states which they are targeting, collecting, and analyzing. This is not to say 
the leaders should be held accountable by the target nation—and they may well be—but instead 
leaders must be aware of how their intelligence activities will be perceived and reacted to. 
Constructs such as the Gerasimov Doctrine, however unofficial they may be, provide crucial 
insights into these perceptions. 
Academics interested in Russian foreign policy, particularly information confrontation, 
have plenty of space to contribute knowledge. This thesis opens the door to viewing foreign 
policy through the lens of Valery Gerasimov, for all its merits and faults. Attributing the Arab 
Spring and Ukraine’s Euromaidan protests to Western intelligence activities may seem far-
fetched to the Western mind, but Gerasimov provides his context for this belief. Researchers can 
use his context and this thesis to create a deeper understanding of how intelligence activities 




effectiveness of Russian information confrontation campaigns can begin to tease out the thought 
processes and logic behind the campaigns.  
Future Research 
 
The Gerasimov Doctrine is not a playbook for new-age warfare, but it is an insight into 
understanding how General Gerasimov views it. Using the Gerasimov Doctrine in this way could 
enable researchers to reverse engineer known influence campaigns. Similar to Peisakhin and 
Rozenlas’ work on the effectiveness of Russian television along the Ukrainian border, future 
research can start with a baseline and known quantities prior to, during, and after an event.138 
Both the 2016 United States presidential elections and the United Kingdom’s 2015 European 
Referendum—“Brexit”—are prime starting points. Both events are quite studied and provide an 
abundance of data, but they are yet to be evaluated for their effectiveness as known Russian 
information confrontation campaigns. 
This thesis found that Russian nationalism is an effective foreign policy tool when 
directed at Ukraine. Nationalism played similarly important roles in the United States and United 
Kingdom during the aforementioned voting periods. Just how much of those votes were affected 
by the Russian Federation’s influence campaigns remains to be seen. This thesis’ findings could 
be combined with Peisakhin and Rozenlas’ methodology and the United States’ unclassified 
information operations doctrine to reverse engineer the campaigns and evaluate their 
effectiveness. 
First, this thesis serves as a blueprint for the logic and rationale behind the influence 
campaigns. Future research would need to operate under the assumption that rational actors 
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designed and executed the campaigns. Next, the United States, perhaps to its own detriment but 
in the interests of transparency, publishes unclassified versions of its military doctrine. The 
doctrine regarding information operations dictates how to measure the effectiveness of its own 
activities. Reversing these steps, using the logic provided in this thesis, could provide a clearer 
understanding of the intent, scope, and target audience of the influence campaigns. Finally, 
Peisakhin and Rozenlas’ work in measuring the effectiveness of Russian messaging, in which 
they account for the difference between a broadcast being received and a message being 
consumed (or viewed), is the missing link in how to analyze these campaigns. Their 
methodology, with the perspective provided by this thesis, and combined with the United States’ 
information operations doctrinal framework, may create a model that can then be validated and 
expanded upon to improve its generalizability. This thesis is a proposed first step on that path. 
The Gerasimov Doctrine is not a doctrine, but a lens with which a reader can view 
interstate behavior on a scale of conflict. It is important because it helps pull back the veil on the 
Russian Federation’s perspective of conflict—not because it is official (it’s not)—but because it 
is from Valery Gerasimov, Putin’s Chief of the General Staff. The Gerasimov Doctrine puts into 
context various military and non-military intelligence operations as elements on a shared scale of 
conflict, citing the Arab Spring and Ukrainian Euromaidan protests as examples. These are 
significant because this combination of military and non-military actions has the potential to 
threaten the Russian Idea, which is a core tenet of Russian sovereignty. The Russian state, today 
represented by the Russian Federation, capitalizes on the Russian Idea by personifying it in 
President Putin. Putin, in turn, uses Russian nationalist rhetoric to shore up support for the 
Russian state as ideological protectors of the Russian Idea. This thesis sought to tie these links 




policy toward the West. That perspective may be summed up by modifying von Clausewtiz’s 
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